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ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF THE PREVENTION
AND CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL
TAX EVASION
CLAUDE L. EICHEL*
The employment of technical methods to deal with fraud in
matters oj taxation is no doubt wholly to be recommended, both for
the good of the communities reaping the benefit of such taxation, and
in the interests of the taxpayers themselves, since any fraud which
goes unpunished leads to an unfair distribution of the burden of public
expenditure and to the payment by one set of persons of sums properly
due by others.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem of international tax evasion is not new, but it has be-
come increasingly significant since the end of World War II.
Income taxation became a permanent part of American life little
more than half a century ago.2 At the time, evasion across international
boundaries was given slight thought by both taxpayers and the govern-
ment, for several reasons. First, high tariffs restricted international trade,
2. Although an income tax existed during the Civil War, it was repealed soon after-
wards. In 1894, the income tax was reintroduced, only to be held unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
However, the passage of the sixteenth amendment to the United States Constitution in 1913,
reestablished its validity, and since March 1, 1913, the income tax has been in continuous
existence.
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and therefore few people participated in it. Second, international travel
and communications were both costly and time consuming, making the
conduct of international transactions somewhat of a chore. Third, and
perhaps most important, comparatively low tax rates' did not provide
sufficient incentive to the evader to justify the effort.
Since World War II, however, changes in these factors have
stimulated the ingenuity of the international tax evader. International
trade and investment have increased enormously, 4 partly as a result of
the lowering of international tariffs.5 Communications are virtually in-
stantaneous, and travel is swift.6 And, of course, high tax rates have
rendered international evasion very profitable.
As recently as 1961, the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Mortimer M. Caplin, remarked that "our workload overseas has in-
creased to such an extent that we are concerned over our ability to
assure a satisfactory level of voluntary compliance among United States
taxpayers in all parts of the world."'
Although international tax evasion has been a concern of tax officials
for more than twenty years, only recently has any large-scale effort been
made by the United States Internal Revenue Service to curb it. This has
been no simple task, since the administrative problems inherent in world-
wide enforcement are both technically complex and fraught with political
and diplomatic ramifications. To place in proper perspective the scope of
the difficulties inherent in a worldwide enforcement program, as compared
to its domestic counterpart, one might well envisage the complexities of a
game of three-dimensional chess, as contrasted with its less formidable
ancestor.
It is the purpose of this article to discuss the administrative aspects
of controlling international tax evasion. In general, we will discuss the
3. In 1913, rates were one percent to six percent, and, but for a brief period around
World War I, it was not until 1938, that the top rates reached seventy-five percent.
4. United States assets and investment abroad have increased from 12,275,000,000
dollars in 1940 to 80,126,000,000 dollars in 1961. International Investment Position: 1940 to
1962, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1964-1965 853. (U.S. Dep't of Com. 1964).
5. On the multi-national level, the most significant factor in the reduction of tariffs has
been the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) to which most of the countries
of the free world, including the United States, are party. In the United States, the Trade
Agreements Act of 1934, the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, and the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 have each contributed to the lowering of tariffs.
For a discussion of customs, tariffs, and reciprocal trade agreements, see Report to
Committee on Ways and Means on United States Customs, Tariffs, and Trade Agree-
ment Laws and Their Administration, (Boggs Report) (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1957). For
a discussion of the GATT see Catudal, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: An
Article-by-Article Analysis in Layman's Language, 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1010 (1961); 45
DEP'T STATE BULL. 35 (1961).
6. "It may be due to jet planes. It may be due to Common Markets. Whatever the
reasons, more and more U.S. Corporations are doing business in more and more foreign
countries." 4 CooPERs & LYBRAND, INT'L REP. No. 3 (July, 1961).
7. Caplin, A Status Report from the Commissioner, 14 TAx Exac. 9, 17 (1961).
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scope of the problem, comparing international versus domestic con-
siderations; indicate the type and nature of the enforcement tools pre-
sently available, and how they are being wielded; and consider the
directions in which efforts to prevent international tax evasion should
proceed. As a caveat, it should be noted that we are here concerned with
the administrative aspects of evasion rather than the substantive means
employed by evaders to achieve their ends.
Our approach will be to view the problem primarily from the stand-
point of the United States tax system, rather than from a general multi-
national level. The reasons for favoring this type of analysis are several:
first, the concept of international cooperation in tax matters is in its
infancy,8 and at its present stage of development, lends itself more
readily to bilateral rather than multilateral solution; second, the principles
involved in international tax administration are common to most systems;
and third, no exhaustive analysis of the area is intended.
The use of the term "taxpayer" will include any person or entity
subject to taxation under our internal revenue laws, be he a citizen,
resident or nonresident alien. Our basic quest will be to seek out the
barriers which result from the crossing of international boundaries and
stand between the taxpayer and the government to which he owes taxes;
to analyze those barriers; and to determine how they can best be re-
moved.9
I. THE PROBLEM
The two basic cornerstones of an effective tax enforcement system
are intelligence and collection. The function of intelligence is necessary
to determine the extent to which taxpayer compliance is being achieved.
By means of it (from an overall standpoint), it is possible to compare
the amount of income being earned by the taxpaying public with the
amount reported by them on their tax returns. Thus, it is possible to
judge effectively how the tax system is functioning as a whole. The
collection function is a logical corollary to that of intelligence, and on a
policy planning level, is easily and more accurately employed. Through
it the amount of income tax assessed can accurately be compared with
the amount actually collected.
But no tax system can function on generalities. It is when applied
to specific cases that the vital necessity of both intelligence and collection
become readily apparent. Through an efficient intelligence network, tax
officials can ascertain which individuals are engaged in activities that
result in tax liability, and what the extent of that liability is. Through
8. King, Tax Assistance from the International Tax Relations Division of the U.S.
Treasury Dept. 2 DoING Bus. ABROAD 582, 584 (1962).
9. It should further be noted that our discussion will be limited to income taxes, since
such taxes are the major source of tax revenue in the United States.
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effective collection procedures, the tax liabilities of taxpayers are liq-
uidated, and the mission of the tax official has been accomplished.
We will now take a closer look at these two functions, both from
their domestic and international aspects.
A. Intelligence
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The intelligence function is comprised of two principal facets. The
first facet is not directed primarily toward any specific evader, but
merely assures a systematic flow of information to the tax authorities.
This flow of information serves an important indirect compliance purpose
in that those who might otherwise evade the revenue laws refrain from
doing so because they are aware that the government is receiving in-
formation as to their income. The second facet is specifically directed
toward the suspected evader, and provides a means of accurately
ascertaining his tax liability, notwithstanding his hostility or lack of
cooperation.
2. DOMESTIC ASPECTS
a. General Intelligence
The first facet of intelligence described above may be referred to
as "general intelligence"-the systematic receipt of information by the
government. In the United States, there are several sources for such
information. The most familiar example of this type is the statement of
annual earnings that must be furnished by all employers to both em-
ployees and the government. ° Since wages constitute the single greatest
source of income, this is a most significant contribution to the efficacy of
the intelligence function. Information reports are also required from
payors of interest or dividends of ten dollars or more," and from those
engaged in trade or business who make payments of income in excess
of six hundred dollars per year to any individual.' 2 Such information has
a high degree of reliability in that it is obtained from third parties who
ordinarily would have no reason to furnish false information.' Although
cross-checking the information received against the income tax returns
filed by taxpayers appears to be a monumental task, the advent of
Automatic Data Processing (ADP), with its high speed computers, is
making this task technically feasible.' 4
10. Such statements are required in connection with all employees who have earnings
subject to withholding tax. Treas. Reg. § 31.6011(a)-4(b) (1960).
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6042. (All further references to sections will be to the
INT. RE V. CODE OF 1954, as amended, unless otherwise indicated.)
12. Section 6041(a).
13. Returns are also required under § 6044 for patronage dividends.
14. Use of automatic data processing on a massive scale began on January 2, 1962, and
is expected to encompass the entire nation by January, 1967. Taylor, Automatic Data
Processing in the Internal Revenue Service 119 J. Accountancy 53 (1965).
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b. Specific Intelligence
The second facet of intelligence, which is directed toward ac-
cumulating information in individual cases under investigation, may be
referred to as "specific intelligence." The first and most obvious such
source of information as to a taxpayer's income is the taxpayer himself.
Our system is basically one of self-assessment, and depends primarily on
the individual taxpayer to make a full account of his income.15
In the United States, this system has functioned well, and most tax-
payers file accurate returns. However, even the well-intentioned taxpayer
may make errors in preparing his return; he may misinterpret a provi-
sion of the Internal Revenue Code so as to wrongly exclude certain items
of income, or claim deductions or exemptions to which he is not entitled.
Therefore, the second source of specific information consists of ex-
amination of the taxpayer's books and records for the purpose of verifying
the correctness of his return, or to determine the correct amount of in-
come where no return has been filed. Where, however, the taxpayer under
examination either has failed to keep accurate records, or refuses to
cooperate with the examining agent; or where the agent suspects fraud,
recourse must be had to other sources of information.
The third such source would be third parties with whom the taxpayer
has had dealings. In the United States, revenue agents have the power to
compel testimony by third parties as to their transactions with the tax-
payer under investigation.'" They also have power to examine a third
party's records,'" including bank records. Third parties are usually co-
operative, both from a desire to keep on good terms with the Internal
Revenue Service, and because the law compels their assistance.' 8 A fourth
source of information, and a primary aid to fraud investigation, is the
informant. The informer may be motivated by the prospect of a reward,' 9
a desire for revenge against the person evading, or perhaps just an aver-
sion to seeing someone else pay less than his share of the tax burden.
Acquisition of specific information is further facilitated by the
closeness of investigators to sources of information, the readiness of other
15. [W]e cannot forget that over 97% of our total revenue collections comes from
self-assessment or voluntary compliance, with only 3% from direct enforcement-although
the significant impact of enforcement on compliance must definitely be taken into account.
Caplin, A Status Report from the Commissioner, 14 TAX Exac. 9, 12 (1961).
Of course, our system is not totally one of self-assessment, since taxes withheld from
salaries constitute a large portion of the personal income tax revenue.
16. Section 7602(3).
17. Section 7602(1).
18. Revenue agents may compel persons to appear before them for questioning
(§ 7602(2)); they may enter any building or other place for purposes of examining articles
or objects subject to tax (§ 7606).
19. Rewards are paid to informers under § 7623. The amount paid varies with the
value of the information given, but rarely exceeds ten percent of the tax recovered. See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (1959).
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law enforcement agencies to cooperate, and the ability of government
agents to keep a close watch over a suspected evader's activities by
personal surveillance.
Although general intelligence may appear to be less dramatic as a
source of information than specific intelligence, and greater accuracy can
be obtained through the conduct of individual investigations, general
reliance on investigation as a primary source of intelligence would be very
costly, and might necessitate the commitment of a large segment of our
population to the enforcement of the tax laws.2 °
3. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
a. Activities of Aliens in the United States
For purposes of United States taxation, resident aliens are generally
treated in the same manner as United States citizens, 2' and they file the
same tax returns. In relation to their activities in the United States, the
same sources of both general and specific intelligence are available to
the government, and function in the same manner.
Intelligence procedures as applied to nonresident aliens deriving
income from United States sources require special adaptation, however.
Information reports at the source are similar to those obtained as to
domestic taxpayers, but with the addition of a collection feature, which
will be discussed elsewhere. 22 Application of specific intelligence tech-
niques is rendered more difficult when a nonresident alien is concerned,
however, for several reasons. First, the nonresident alien, almost by
definition, is not physically present within the United States, and is there-
fore rendered less accessible to our investigative agents. Second, being
beyond our borders, he may also feel himself beyond the jurisdiction of
our tax authorities. Third, he might feel no desire to cooperate in con-
tributing to the revenue of a government to which he owes no allegiance.
These factors do not vitiate the intelligence function completely, how-
ever, because the nonresident alien is subject to tax only on his United
States source income,2" and the information is generally available to our
agents at the source of payment.
20. For the 1962 fiscal year, the Internal Revenue Service had the following authorized
enforcement personnel:
Revenue Agents 11,848
Special Agents 1,616
Office Auditors 3,034
Revenue Officers 5,789
Tax Examiners 4,695
Caplin, A Status Report from the Commissioner, 14 TAx ExEc. 9 (1961).
21. A minor exception exists in that the entitlement of the alien resident in the United
States to the benefits of the foreign tax credit is dependent on whether the country of which
he is a citizen allows a similar credit to United States citizens residing in that country.
Section 901(b) (3).
22. See text accompanying note 60 infra.
23. See §§ 871-895.
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b. Activities of Resident Aliens Overseas
As mentioned previously, resident aliens are generally treated on a
par with United States citizens for tax purposes. In other words, both are
taxable in the United States on their worldwide income. However, the
problems of obtaining intelligence as to the overseas activities of resident
taxpayers are infinitely greater when an alien is involved than when the
taxpayer is a United States citizen. This is especially true when informa-
tion is sought from the country of which the alien is a citizen.
The basic problem is that laws generally do not have extraterritorial
effect, and the United States does not have access to the same type of
information that it would have in this country. In the absence of a treaty,
it is virtually impossible to obtain any general intelligence from a foreign
country, since no country will undertake systematically to inform another
government as to the domestic activities of its own citizens. Moreover,
even when a treaty does exist, there is usually an express reservation
against any "informing" as to the signatory's own citizens. 4 This, of
course, imposes a great administrative burden on the country seeking
the information, since it must rely on specific forms of intelligence, neces-
sitating individual investigation for each taxpayer involved. Since this is
impractical, great reliance must be placed on the taxpayer's own dec-
larations.25
One method of encouraging compliance is to spot-check taxpayers'
financial affairs, as well as to make specific investigations where there is
reason to suspect noncompliance or fraud. Unfortunately, the ability of a
country even to make a specific investigation of an alien's foreign ac-
tivities is severely restricted.
The resident alien is less likely to report his foreign source income
24. See text infra at p. 54, et seq.
25. France, in taxing individuals, places great emphasis on tangible signs of wealth,
There are eight classes of such items taken into consideration in the income determination:
1. Principal residence of taxpayer
2. Additional residences
3. Servants employed
4. Automobiles
5. Yachts
6. Power Boats
7. Private airplanes
8. Race horses
Each item is given an income equivalent. For instance, if the taxpayer employs a single
servant in his home, it is presumed that his annual income cannot be less than 1,215 dollars.
Each additional servant indicates an additional income of 1,822 dollars. Automobiles have
an income equivalent of about 30 dollars per United States brake horsepower. Residences
are given an income equivalent of the annual rental value multiplied by a factor of three
to six.
In addition, if the taxpayer owns property in more than three of the above classes,
his taxable income is increased further from twenty five percent (four classes) to one
hundred percent (more than six classes). 2 Coopa Rs & LYBRAND, INTERNATIONAL TAX
NEWSLETTER 10 (1959).
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to the United States than is his citizen counterpart. There are several
reasons for this. First, many resident aliens are not aware that their non-
United States source income is subject to United States income taxation.
Many of them are also unaware of the United States foreign tax credit,26
and feel that it is unfair to have to report the same income to more than
one country. Second, even when the resident alien is aware that this in-
come is required to be reported, he may feel that there is little chance of
discovery by the United States of his foreign source income.17 The third
possible reason is that the alien, not having primary allegiance to the
United States, may feel no great moral obligation to cooperate with the
United States tax authorities.
The second method of obtaining specific intelligence-examination
of the taxpayer's books and records-is also much more difficult to use
effectively outside of the United States. As the internal revenue agent has
no powers available to him that would authorize him to compel the
production overseas of the books and records,2" he must rely to a great
extent on the alien's cooperation. But here also, too much reliance cannot
be placed on this procedure.2
The next source of specific intelligence-recourse to third parties
having dealings with the taxpayer-also leaves a great deal to be desired.
As mentioned, United States revenue agents have no official authority in
a foreign jurisdiction,"° and third parties may well prove uncooperative.
Third parties have no particular motivation to assist the United States in
enforcing its tax laws against one of their fellow countrymen.3 More-
over, hostility or indifference may also be encountered on the part of the
foreign country's government officials. 2 Thus, the absence of power to
26. See § 901.
27. "Psychologically, if a United States taxpayer knows information on his income
from (abroad) is not beyond the reach of the Internal Revenue Service, he is likely to be
stimulated to report correctly in the first place." Caplin, International Cooperation in
the Field of Taxation, 14 TAX EXEC. 324, 326 (1962),.
28. Id. at 327; See Newman, Tax Administration in Striped Trousers: The Inter-
national Operations Program of the Internal Revenue Service, 12 TAX. L. REV. 171 (1957);
In Europe, accounting data constitute only one factor considered in the determination of
taxes. See note 25 supra. McCuLLOUGH, THE FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, THE CommoN
MARKET, AND TAXES 45 (1960).
29. "[Enforcement] has presented formidable problems in countries where business
has not installed adequate accounting or bookkeeping systems, where more transactions
are carried out in cash than by check, where there is a high proportion of small farmers
or small businessmen who keep only meager records of their operations." PATCH, EUROPEAN
TAXES AND TAX EVASION 672 (1952).
30. Caplin, supra note 27, at 327; Newman, supra note 28, at 202.
31. Tax Enforcement in many countries presents formidable problems because of the
absence of voluntary compliance, and the general feeling that out-witting the tax collector
is a fine sport. See PATCH, supra note 29; According to a survey by the United States
Mutual Security Agency, tax enforcement in Europe has not presented serious problems
in Belgium, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, or West Germany. Tax Receipts
of Selected European Countries Participating in the Mutual Security Program. (Mimeo-
graphed publication March 31, 1952).
32. For instance, in Latin America, there is a traditional reluctance on the part of
1965]
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compel testimony, the lack of access to the records of third parties, and
the reluctance of third parties to assist a foreign government's tax officials,
combine to make the gathering of this kind of information very difficult.
On the other hand, quite often the foreign government will assist our
government in obtaining the information on an informal basis.
Because of the severe restrictions on the obtaining of information
outlined above, a measure of reliance must be placed on paid informers.
This source of information is not entirely satisfactory, however, since it
is often difficult to verify the information received. Moreover, some
countries have laws prohibiting "economic espionage,""8 and the Internal
Revenue Service would not be party to the violation of a foreign law.
However, when the informer offers information to the United States
authorities, the government will not overly concern itself with the means
employed to obtain the information.
c. Activities of United States Citizens Overseas
The United States is not nearly as impotent in obtaining information
as to the income of its citizens abroad as it is in obtaining information as
to aliens. Of course, the basic problem still exists-the absence of extra-
territorial effect of our laws.
There are a few sources of general intelligence available to United
States tax authorities concerning the overseas activities of United States
citizens. One type of information received from third parties stems from
the requirement that United States citizen or resident officers and directors
of foreign corporations must notify the Internal Revenue Service upon
formation of the corporation, when any United States person84 owns
five percent or more in value of the stock.88
Another "third party" type of general information is obtained
through some of our tax treaties which provide for the automatic ex-
change of information regarding dividends, interest, and other fixed and
determinable income paid to persons with addresses in the other country,
but these provisions appear only in a few treaties.8
governments to take rigorous enforcement action against tax evaders. But some countries
have instituted criminal penalties for evasion, and others have given their tax officials
greater authority. Caplin, supra note 27, at 331.
33. E.g., Switzerland.
34. "Person" includes both citizens and resident aliens. See § 7701 (a) (30).
35. Section 6046(a) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.6046-1(j). (1962). The return is due within either
ninety days after the formation of the corporation, or after the five percent requirement
is first met. See text, p. 51, infra.
36. Treaty with Canada, Art. XX; Treaty with France, Art. 9; Treaty with Nether-
lands, Art. XXI; Treaty with Norway, Art. XVI; Treaty with Sweden, Art. XVI. For
treaty citations, see note 45, infra.
Under the treaty with Canada, for instance, the United States in 1961, furnished
Canada with more than 150,000 information returns, which represented income of about
one hundred and fifty million dollars. Caplin, supra note 27, at 327.
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There are several instances where information returns (in addition
to the usual tax returns) are required to be filed by the United States
taxpayer himself." The obligation to notify the Internal Revenue Service
upon the formation of a foreign corporation" is also imposed on the five
percent shareholder himself.89 A second instance in which an information
return is required is when a United States taxpayer forms, or makes a
transfer to, a foreign trust.40 These, however, are basically onetime re-
quirements. As long as there is no change in status, no further informa-
tion returns are required. On the other hand, annual information reports
are required4' from persons "controlling" 42 foreign corporations. These
reports furnish the government with a great amount of information which
it can use to determine whether any transactions taxable in the United
States have occurred."
While the information gleaned from these reports has given the
Internal Revenue Service a more accurate picture of the foreign activities
of United States taxpayers, reliance must necessarily be placed on the
veracity of the taxpayer himself. Fortunately, the United States citizen,
overseas or not, will usually file accurate returns, and will cooperate
fully with his government. However, when the taxpayer fails to give
correct information, or fails to file the return required, penalties44 are
imposed. But here, as in other instances where dependence for informa-
tion is placed on the taxpayer, it is difficult to detect violations without
information from independent sources.
Of course, while there are defects inherent in a system which relies
on the taxpayer himself for the furnishing of information, few alternatives
exist. For instance, it would be useless to require a report from the
foreign trustee of a foreign trust established by a United States taxpayer,
since there is no way of enforcing this requirement. One other solution
that might be proposed would be to impose the annual foreign corpor-
ation report requirement on the corporation's officers and directors, in-
stead of on those "controlling" the corporation. But since the officers
and directors are chosen by those controlling the corporation, their inde-
pendence is questionable.
37. This applies to both resident aliens and citizens.
38. See note 35 supra. See also text, p. 51, infra, for a discussion of the statutory
provision.
39. Section 6046(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.6038-2(k) (1962) provides that where two or
more persons are required to furnish the same information, they may file a joint informa-,
tion return (Form 2952).
40. Section 6048.
41. Section 6038(a).
42. With minor variations, the attribution rules of § 318(a) apply; see § 6038(d)(1).
43. For instance, the annual information returns required under § 6038 provide for
eleven different categories of information, both as to financial position and detailed sum-
maries of transactions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6038-2(f) (1962).
44. Both civil and criminal.
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Specific intelligence is also less difficult to obtain when a United
States citizen is involved, although the handicaps are still formidable.
The absence of official investigative authority is still the major impedi-
ment, but the revenue agent is less likely to encounter the same reluctance
of persons to give information when our nationals are involved. By the
same token, foreign governments will often be more cooperative in as-
sisting our agents in obtaining information as to our citizens' activities
in their country.
Most of the tax treaties to which the United States is a party contain
provisions providing for exchange of information upon specific request,45
but some of these treaties restrict this power to situations where tax-
payers might wrongfully seek to take advantage of treaty provisions
providing for lower rates of tax.46
B. Collection
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Intelligence is a vital function, but in a sense it is only a preliminary
one. For once the identity of the taxpayer and the extent of his liability
are determined, the taxes must then be collected. A government may have
established a most efficient and effective intelligence operation, and even
have identified all possible taxable transactions; it may have accurately
determined the actual tax liability of each one of its taxpayers, only to
find that all its efforts were for naught. For the ultimate success or
failure of a program of tax administration depends on the amount of
taxes ultimately reaching the coffers of the nation's treasury.
45. Treaty with Australia, Art. XVIII(1), 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2274, T.IA.S. 2880;
Treaty with Austria, Art. XVI(1), 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1699, T.I.A.S. 3923; Treaty with
Belgium, Art. XV(1), 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1647, T.I.A.S. 2833; Treaty with Canada, Arts.
XIX, XXI, 50 Stat. 1399, T.S. 920; Treaty with Denmark, Art. XVII, 62 Stat. 1730,
T.I.A.S. 1854; Treaty with Finland, Art. XVII, 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 4485, T.I.A.S. 2596;
Treaty with France, Arts. 8(1), 11, 59 Stat. 893, T.S. 988; Treaty with Germany, Art.
XVI(1),, 5 U.S.T. & O.IA. 2768, T.I.A.S. 3133; Treaty with Greece, Art. XVIII, 5 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 47, T.I.A.S. 2902; Treaty with Honduras, Art. XVIII(1), 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 219,
T.I.A.S. 3766; Treaty with Ireland, Art. XX(1), 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2303, T.I.A.S. 2356;
Treaty with Italy, Art. XVII, 7 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2999, T.I.A.S. 3679; see Rado, The Tax
Convention Between the United States and Italy, 14 TAX L. REv. 203, 220 (1959); Treaty
with Japan, Art. XVII(1), 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 149, T.I.A.S. 3176; Treaty with Luxembourg,
Art. XVIII(1),-U.S.T. & O.I.A.-, T.I.A.S.-, CCH TAX TREATIES f 5302 (Feb. 1965);
Treaty with the Netherlands, Art. XXI, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. 1855; Treaty with New
Zealand, Art. XVI(1), 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2378, T.I.A.S. 2360; Treaty with Norway, Art.
XV, 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2323, T.I.A.S. 2357; Treaty with Pakistan, Art. XVI(1), 10 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 984, T.I.A.S. 4232; Treaty with South Africa, Art. XIV, 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3821,
T.I.A.S. 2510; Treaty with Sweden, Arts. XV, XVIII, 54 Stat. 1759, T.S. 958; Treaty with
Switzerland, Art. XVI(1)., 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1751, T.I.A.S. 2316; Treaty with the United
Kingdom, Art. XX(1), 60 Stat. 1377, T.I.A.S. 1546.
46. However, there are fewer such restrictions in those treaties merely providing for
exchange of information than there are in treaties providing for collection assistance.
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2. DOMESTIC ASPECTS
a. Pay-As-You-Go
The most effective way of collecting taxes is to have the tax withheld
at the source of the income, and to have the withholding party remit it
directly to the government. Psychologically, there is probably less of a
traumatic shock to the taxpayer when he never sees the money as com-
pared to when he has to physically part with it after receiving it.
In the United States, taxes applicable to wages earned by employees
are required to be withheld by all employers,4 7 and remitted by them
directly to the government 48 at least quarterly.49 Although the tax with-
held may not exactly equal the actual tax liability, any required adjust-
ment is made when the employee files his annual income tax return. As
mentioned previously, the withholding system also provides an important
intelligence feature in that the government is simultaneously informed
of the wage earner's salary income.
Another feature of our domestic tax system that also serves to spread
the tax burden evenly over the tax year is the system of estimated tax
payments.5" This is an extension of the pay-as-you-go feature to all other
types of income. By this method, the government is able to collect a large
portion of its taxes even before any tax returns are filed. Of course, the
estimated tax system is based upon a taxpayer's own declarations, and
the tax is paid by the taxpayer himself, rather than by any third party.
b. Payment with Return
The second method of tax collection in the United States is ac-
complished through payment submitted by the taxpayer with his return,51
or by payment made voluntarily after assessment by the government.5 2
Apart from income tax withheld from the wages of employees, this is by
far the most typical method of collection. Once it has been determined
that a deficiency exists, most taxpayers proceed to liquidate that defi-
ciency voluntarily, either by remitting payment with the return, or,
when the deficiency arises subsequent to an examination by the Internal
Revenue Service, after a formal request for payment is made.
47. Section 3402(a).
48. Payment is made to a government depositary if so required under Treas. Reg. §
31.6302(c)-i (1960).
49. Treas. Reg. § 31.6011(a)-4 (1959); the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may
require monthly payments if the withholding agent is remiss in his duties. See § 7512(b).
50. Section 6153(a).
51. Section 6151.
52. Section 6155.
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c. Enforcement Procedures
When the taxpayer does not meet his tax obligations voluntarily, the
Internal Revenue Service has broad powers to resort to self-help by
seizing the taxpayer's property and using it to satisfy the taxpayer's
indebtedness.
Each district director's office contains a collection division, whose
revenue officers have the duty to liquidate taxpayers' liabilities for income
(and other) taxes. They not only have the power to seize a taxpayer's
physical property,5" but may also levy against sums to which the taxpayer
is entitled from third parties."4 When the taxpayer has transferred his
property to others in order to avoid payment of his taxes, the govern-
ment may still levy against this property in the hands of the transferee.55
When the government has reason to believe that its taxes are in
jeopardy, either because of the imminent expiration of the limitations
period, or the suspected flight of either the taxpayer or his property from
the United States, the Internal Revenue Service has the power to institute
jeopardy proceedings.56 This consists of the termination by the govern-
ment of the taxpayer's taxable year,57 the making of an immediate as-
sessment of an amount at least equal to the taxes which may be owed, 8
and proceeding to levy upon the taxpayer's property in satisfaction of the
assessment.59
One aid to the collection process that stems from the intelligence
function, is that in the process of determining the taxpayer's income, it
is also possible to determine the nature, extent, and location of the tax-
payer's property. As a result, both time and duplication of effort can be
spared in satisfying the taxpayer's liability.
3. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
a. Collection at the Source
When payments of periodic income are made to nonresident aliens,
the payor is generally obligated to withhold thirty percent of the pay-
ment,60 and remit the withheld amount to the Internal Revenue Service.
Income subject to withholding includes compensation for services, fees,
53. Section 6331.
54. Ibid.
55. Section 6901.
56. Section 6851(a) (1).
57. Ibid.
58. Section 6861.
59. Section 6331.
60. Section 1441(a); Where a tax treaty exists with the country of which the non-
resident alien is a citizen, this rate is often reduced. Section 1442 provides for similar with-
holding on payments to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business in the United
States.
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commissions, salaries, remunerations, emoluments, dividends, rentals,
royalties, and interest." This periodic income is generally subject to a
flat thirty percent tax rate, and the withholding usually satisfies in full
the tax liability of the nonresident alien attributable to this income. 2
Since a large proportion of United States source income derived by non-
resident aliens is periodic income, collection from this class of taxpayers
is greatly facilitated.
b. Payment with Return
When the taxpayer resides outside of the United States, and incurs
liability for United States income tax that is not satisfied by withholding
at the source, he is required to make full payment with his tax return. The
motivation for making payment is greater in cases when the taxpayer has
property in the United States because of an awareness that the govern-
ment can use his property to satisfy his tax liability should he fail to do
so. When the income is derived from the conduct of a trade or business in
the United States, business property may exist which can be used to sat-
isfy the tax claims of the government.
When the taxpayer has no property in the United States which can
be levied upon to satisfy his tax obligations, his motivation to pay his
taxes may not be great, and collection is accordingly rendered quite
difficult. However, an errant taxpayer, if an alien, should realize that he
may have difficulty in reentering the United States in the future, especially
if he failed to obtain a tax clearance when he left.68 However, when the
taxpayer has no property in the United States, and does not intend to
return, the taxes owed will generally prove uncollectible.
c. Enforcement Procedures
Several alternatives are open to the Internal Revenue Service when
it seeks to collect taxes from a taxpayer who resides outside of the United
States. First, of course, if the taxpayer has property of any kind in this
country, it may be levied upon to satisfy his liability. There is little
difficulty in accomplishing this, since the government has statutory
authority to do so, and our courts will recognize any action taken pursuant
to this authority.
The second alternative is to attempt to collect the taxes in the foreign
country in which the taxpayer has repaired. Unfortunately, under the
present state of international law, legal efforts to enforce the claim will
fail, for a country will generally refuse to enforce any claim by another
61. Section 1441(b); T.I.R. 706 (March 11, 1965).
62. Section 871(a).
63. The Office of International Operations entered into an informal agreement with
the State Department in September, 1963, whereby the Internal Revenue Service is to
supply the names of delinquent aliens to the State Department. The departing alien might
therefore encounter difficulty upon his re-entry to the United States.
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country arising from a liability for taxes. 64 The third alternative is for
the government to wait until the taxpayer or some of his property reenters
the United States, and then attempt to levy upon any assets in our
jurisdiction. 5
d. Tax Treaties
Several of our tax treaties provide that one country will assist the
other in collecting taxes from persons in the other country.66 Some treaties
have denied the application of these provisions to the collection of taxes
owed by citizens of the country whose collection aid is sought.6 7 Other
treaties have restricted application of the collection provisions to the
collection of taxes evaded through wrongful use of treaty benefits.6 8 For
reasons to be discussed later, not much use has been made of these
collection provisions, and, as used, these provisions have not proved of
much assistance in facilitating collection of taxes.69
II. CU-RENT ENFORCEMENT TOOLS
A. General Considerations
Thus far we have endeavored to indicate some of the problems that
arise from the international application of the functions of intelligence
and collection. It should be evident at this point that serious limitations
are imposed upon a government's power to enforce its revenue laws
outside of the confines of its borders. But some enforcement tools are
available to the tax administrator, and the difficulties or complexities of
64. See Part III infra, p. 66 et seq.
65. Generally, after an assessment is made, the government has six years within which
to either levy on the taxpayer's property, or to collect via a court proceeding (Section
6502(a)). However, where collection is hindered or delayed because the taxpayer's
property is situated or held outside the United States, the six-year period is suspended
for the period collection is so hindered or delayed. This suspension cannot continue for
more than six additional years (making a maximum total of twelve years). Section
6503 (c).
66. Treaty with France, Art. 12 (restricted effective Jan. 1, 1950); Treaty with the
Netherlands, Art. XXII(1),(2),(3) (but does not apply as to citizens of state to which
application is made. See note 67 infra); Treaty with Sweden, Art. XVII; op. cit. supra,
note 45.
67. E.g., Treaty with France, Art. 12(5) (added by Art. I(1) of Supplementary Pro-
tocol effective Jan. 1, 1950).
68. Treaty with Australia, Art. XVI; Treaty with Finland, Art. XVIII; Treaty with
Germany, Art. XVI(2); Treaty with Greece, Art. XIX and protocol, Jan. 1, 1953; Treaty
with Honduras, Art. XVIII(2); Treaty with Italy, Art. XVIII; Treaty with Japan, Art.
XVII(2); Treaty with the Netherlands, Art. XXII(4) (This restricted provision applies
only where a request is made regarding a citizen of the state to which application is made.
Otherwise, the general collection provisions apply); Treaty with New Zealand, Art. XVII;
Treaty with Norway, Art. XVII (the treaty as originally signed provided for general re-
ciprocal collection, but the United States Senate conditioned its approval on its modifica-
tion); Treaty with South Africa, Art. XV (broad collection provisions modified by United
States Senate in protocol signed July 14, 1950); Treaty with Switzerland, Art. XVI(2);
op. cit. supra, note 45.
69. See "Tax Treaties," p. 00 inira.
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enforcement should not justify making the evader's lot any easier than
is necessitated by present limitations.
In the United States, the recognition of abuses in the international
area led to mobilization against the international evader. This mobiliza-
tion took the form of organizing the Office of International Operations
within the Internal Revenue Service in order. to better cope with interna-
tional problems administratively; enactment of statutory aids to inter-
national enforcement; and an attempt at international cooperation
through the negotiation of bilateral tax treaties. These have been com-
paratively recent developments.7"
In order to determine where even greater improvements might be
made in combatting international evasion, it is necessary to analyze these
enforcement tools, and to examine the manner in which they are being
wielded.
B. Office of International Operations
1. BACKGROUND
Prior to 1955, the Internal Revenue Service was poorly equipped to
deal efficiently with international problems. Responsibility for handling
cases with international aspects was distributed among the many district
directors' offices throughout the United States. In each office, cases with
international aspects represented a small portion of the annual volume,
but usually contained complexities out of proportion to their number.
No one district could afford to allocate sufficient personnel or resources
to this area without sacrificing other district office functions considered
of greater importance.71
In 1955, a survey was made by the Treasury Department, and
several investigators were sent to Europe to check on the level of com-
pliance by our overseas taxpayers. Their findings established that
compliance was at a low level, 2 and this was attributed to two principal
factors.
The first was the unfamiliarity of taxpayers abroad with our world-
wide source rules, and their lack of knowledge that the exclusion of over-
seas earned income 73 does not eliminate the need for filing a tax return.
74
70. Caplin, International Cooperation in the Field of Taxation, 14 TAX ExEc. 324, 327
(1962); "For long centuries, national boundaries have served as the door to sanctuary for
fugitives from justice, including the evader. It is only within our lifetime that inroads
have been made on the tax evader's safe retreat."
71. Ofice of International Operations of the Internal Revenue Service, Machinery
and Allied Products Institute 11 (1964).
72. Newman, supra note 28, at 171.
73. Section 911(a).
74. Prior to 1958, a return was still required where the taxpayer had other than
"earned income." Since 1958, § 6012(c) has required a return, even when the exclusion
of income under § 911(a) was being claimed.
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Of course, unfamiliarity with our laws does not constitute a valid excuse
for noncompliance, but it must be remembered that educational and infor-
mational facilities for taxpayers are not as readily available overseas.
For instance, in the United States, help is often only a telephone call
away, since Internal Revenue Service offices, attorneys and accountants
are readily accessible to all taxpayers."5
The second reason found by the investigators was the lack of any
coherent government audit function, and the absence of any front-line
enforcement procedures." After all, it is difficult to check on a taxpayer's
activities from thousands of miles away.
On August 22, 1955, the International Operations Division of the
Internal Revenue Service was established. Organizationally, it was a part
of the Baltimore district director's office, with headquarters in Washing-
ton. In the IOD were concentrated all international enforcement functions
which previously had been the province of the many district directors.
At the time of its organization, its stated mission77 was to "provide
for the centralization of responsibility for the international operations
of the Internal Revenue Service, and to obtain better administration of
Service affairs abroad." It was given primary responsibility for the ad-
ministration of the United States internal revenue laws in all areas of the
world outside of the geographical jurisdiction of the United States.
Among the functions assigned to the International Operations Divi-
sion were:
1. The taking of appropriate and necessary action to maintain
a satisfactory level of voluntary compliance among United
States taxpayers residing, located or doing business in the
geographical areas assigned; and
2. The audit of returns of nonresident taxpayers, the collection
of delinquent accounts of such nonresidents,... the conduct
of surveys and investigations concerning delinquency and
evasion in the assigned areas, the conduct of military and
other taxpayer education and assistance programs abroad,
the maintenance of close liaison with the military services
concerning Federal tax matters, the executive direction of
Service personnel temporarily detailed or permanently sta-
tioned in the assigned areas, and other responsibilities neces-
sary or incident to the proper administration and enforce-
ment of the tax laws with respect to taxpayers residing,
located or doing business in the assigned areas of responsi-
bility. 8
75. Newman, supra note 28, at 172.
76. Id. at 176.
77. Rev. Proc. 55-2, CB 1955-2, at 898.
78. Ibid. See Office of International Operations, supra note 71, at 11.
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In 1960, the International Operations Division became the Office
of International Operations, and was made a part of the National Office
of the Internal Revenue Service as part of the Office of Assistant Com-
missioner (Compliance). The Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) is
charged with directing, coordinating and evaluating the work of the OIO."
2. FUNCTIONS8 °
The Office of International Operations is headed by a "Director of
International Operations," whose mission is to:
Encourage and achieve the highest possible degree of voluntary
compliance with the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes
on the part of citizens residing or doing business abroad, foreign
taxpayers deriving income from sources within the United
States, and taxpayers required to withhold tax on certain pay-
ments to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations."'
The Director accomplishes his mission by:
1. Administering and enforcing the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code and related statutes in all areas of the world
outside the United States;
2. Administering the provisions of tax conventions with foreign
governments concerning the exchange of information, reci-
procity in tax collection, consideration and processing of
claims alleging double taxation, preparation and issuing of
determination letters, and all other provisions of tax conven-
tions (except those relating to the preparation of regulations
and rulings concerning the interpretation of tax conven-
tions) ;
3. Administering the law relating to the withholding of tax on
certain payments to nonresident aliens and foreign corpor-
ations;
4. Coordinating for the Service all foreign tax investigations
and requests for information (other than those relating to
regulations or rulings or in the area of general assistance in
the field of administration) from foreign countries or United
States possessions;
7. Coordinates foreign travel of Service personnel, and main-
tains foreign posts.8 2
79. Id. at 12.
80. CCH 1965 STAND. FED. TAx REP. fT 5983, reprinted from Statement of Reorganiza-
tion and Functions, TREAS. DEPT. PUBL. No. 383 (Rev. 7-62).
81. Id. Treas. Reg. § 113.56 (1962).
82. Ibid.
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It is readily apparent from the above that the missions of the Office
of International Operations and its director are comprehensive in the
international enforcement area. By centralizing all international functions
in one office, a well-coordinated enforcement program is thereby facil-
itated.
3. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
In less than ten years, the Office of International Operations has
grown from a four-man unit into a substantial branch of the Internal
Revenue Service with approximately five hundred employees.88 Generally,
the 010 operates like any district director's office, with collection, audit,
and intelligence divisions. But in addition, the 010 has two units peculiar
to its specialized operation. The first is the Executive Assistant to the
Director, who in addition to assisting the Director in the carrying out
of his duties, is charged with the conduct of foreign posts, and general
intra and inter-agency liaison and coordination. The second unit is the
Operational Research Staff, which, among other duties, is charged with
devising methods of detecting international tax evasion, and devising
procedures for minimizing tax avoidance.84
In addition to its national office functions, the 010 also has agents
assigned to various district directors' offices to assist local revenue agents
in any cases with international aspects. These agents work directly
through the local district directors, although general international policy
originates at the national office level. As a result of the availability of
010 agents at the local level, cases originating in district directors' offices
may be processed on a local level, without the necessity of referring them
to Washington each time an international aspect appears. It apparently
is hoped also that the easier accessibility to 010 experts will encourage
local revenue agents to seek their assistance more often.
4. FOREIGN POSTS
The 010 operates abroad primarily through its foreign posts. These
"posts" consist of agents permanently stationed overseas, and attached to
various United States embassies.8 5 The 010 now has, or expects to have
shortly, seventeen agents stationed in nine different countries.8 6 These
agents have diplomatic status, and while operationally under the direction
of the 010, are primarily responsible for their activities to the United
States ambassador of the country in which they are stationed or operate.
83. Fox, Functioning of the Office of International Operations, 22 N.Y.U. TAX INST.
735, 736 (1964).
84. Id. at 739.
85. These agents are officially entitled "Revenue Service Representatives."
86. Ottawa, Canada 2; Sao Paulo, Brazil 2; Paris, France 3; London, England 2;
Manila, Phillipines 4; Tokyo, Japan 1; Rome, Italy 1; Bonn, West Germany 1; Mexico
City, Mexico 1.
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These agents constitute the "front-line troops" whose absence was
thought to account for the low measure of compliance by United States
taxpayers overseas. They represent the Internal Revenue Service abroad,
and serve varied functions, including assistance of taxpayers in the prep-
aration of their United States income tax returns.87
It is, however, the enforcement functions performed by these agents
that are of primary interest to our discussion. First, there is the intel-
ligence function.
When a revenue agent or a special agent (intelligence division) is
investigating a case in the United States, and finds that information is
required that can only be obtained in a foreign country, the agent will
request that the information be secured by the 010 agent in the country
concerned. From an administrative point of view, this policy seems pref-
erable to one where our domestic agents would be constantly traveling
back and forth. Because of diplomatic ramifications, it seems more
desirable that an agent who has intimate knowledge of conditions in the
country concerned be charged with responsibility for the acquisition of
the required information.
One problem in attempting to procure information in a foreign
country is that even the local tax officials may not have the legal power
to compel their own citizens to come forward with information in tax
matters.88 But when the cooperation of the foreign tax official is an
important factor in obtaining information, the personal contact that the
overseas agent has with these officials often is a determining factor in
achieving success.
Even though the Revenue Service Representative has no official
investigative authority abroad, he is often able to obtain information on
an informal basis in the same manner, for instance, as a private detective
would in this country. In addition, the fact that he is unable to compel
production of information does not necessarily mean that he is unable
to obtain voluntary cooperation, especially from other United States tax-
payers. Very often, the mere fact of personal contact with United States
taxpayers overseas is sufficient to prod "voluntary" compliance.
Personal contact is often sufficient to insure collection of delinquent
87. Office of International Operations, supra note 71, at 16.
88. Fox, supra note 83, at 737; Caplin, International Cooperation in the Field of
Taxation, 14 TAx ExEc. 324, 326 (1962); One solution to this problem lies in the field
of tax treaties. For instance, for the implementation of the double taxation convention of
March 30, 1949, between Sweden and the United Kingdom, England enacted § 353(2) of
the Income Tax Act of 1952, which provides that the obligation to secrecy imposed by any
United Kingdom enactment shall not prevent the United Kingdom Revenue authorities
from disclosing to any officer of the Swedish government such information as is required
to he disclosed under the treaty. See KocH & EKENBErG, TAx RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN
(International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 1956).
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taxes. Overseas taxpayers sometimes lose their sense of insulation from
our tax laws when the presence of the Internal Revenue Service is felt
close at hand. Even when the United States taxpayer refuses to pay his
delinquent taxes, the Revenue Service Representative may be able to
peruse his activities so as possibly to detect the contemplated transfer
of property to the United States which might then be levied upon to
satisfy the taxpayer's liability.
In addition to obtaining information and attempting to collect taxes,
the overseas agent also performs some audit functions,8" although the
successful performance of this function, as noted, depends on taxpayer
cooperation.
5. OPERATIONAL RESEARCH STAFF
The need to learn more about the expanding overseas activities of
United States taxpayers, and the tax implications of those activities, led
in 1960, to the creation of the Operational Research Staff. ° This unit is
comprised of some of the most experienced 010 agents, and includes
several attorneys. Among its assigned functions are the preparation of
analytical studies of technical problems and tax avoidance schemes in the
international area for the purpose of disclosing Internal Revenue Code
provisions that are weak, ineffective, inconsistent, or unjust.91 It also
prepares plans and programs to combat tax avoidance and evasion in the
international area. The efforts of the Operational Research Staff spot-
lighted patterns of tax avoidance which were helpful to the Treasury
Department in the formulation of its legislative recommendations which
were enacted in the Revenue Act of 1962.2 The Staff now is composed of
a number of two-man attorney-agent teams, which can be deployed on
projects independently as problems arise. Part of the staff's effectiveness
is a result of its liaison with the International Operations Branch of the
Chief Counsel's office, for coordination of the legal aspects of cases, and
with the Treasury Department's International Tax Affairs section for
coordination of policy.
6. EFFECTIVENESS
Through the activities of the 010, relative chaos has been replaced
by a systematic, coordinated, and large-scale enforcement effort in the
international area. Although the 010 is severely handicapped by extrater-
ritorial impotence, it is probably doing the best that can be expected under
present conditions. The key to future effectiveness lies in the area of
international cooperation among tax authorities. But many foreign gov-
89. Fox, supra note 83, at 739.
90. Ibid.
91. Treas. Reg. § 113.562 (1962); Statement of Organizational Functions, supra
note 80.
92. Ibid.
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ernments do not share our concern over tax evasion, and it will probably
take time until fullscale international cooperation can be achieved.
Probably the greatest significance of the 010 has been that its
establishment as a permanent enforcement agency manifests the deter-
mination of the Internal Revenue Service to do all within its power to
control international tax evasion.
C. Statutory Aids
While many of the powers conferred on the Internal Revenue Service
by statute are available for use in cases with international aspects, these
powers can generally only be exercised within the jurisdictional limits
of the United States. There are, however, several statutory provisions that
primarily apply to the international area, and they are exercised at the
point where the overseas taxpayer comes into contact with the United
States, either by his physical presence, the presence of his income-
producing property, or the presence of his agents.
1. SAILING PERMITS
Generally, the United States citizen may travel abroad freely, without
any necessity of settling his accounts with the Internal Revenue Service
before departing from the United States. However, if the Service deter-
mines that the imminent departure of the citizen or of his property is
motivated by a desire to evade payment of his taxes, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue has the power to terminate the citizen's taxable year,
make immediate demand for payment of all taxes due, and proceed to
collect such taxes if not immediately paid." But this provision is ex-
ercised against the United States citizen only in extraordinary cir-
cumstances when the Internal Revenue Service has good reason to sus-
pect foul play. 4 Ordinarily, a United States citizen will return, and
not attempt to use his departure as a means of evasion. 5 In any event,
the relatively few instances when a United States citizen will be involved
in evasion by permanently removing himself from the jurisdiction of the
United States apparently do not justify the imposition of an additional
tax reporting or payment burden because of his travel abroad.
This is not true when the departing traveler is an alien, whether
resident or nonresident. An alien is not bound to our country by the
same ties of loyalty as is a citizen, and is not subject to the same suasion
overseas as would be an American citizen. Congress therefore believed
that aliens should be required to settle their tax liabilities with the Internal
Revenue Service before being permitted to leave our jurisdiction, and
93. Section 6851(a).
94. Section 6851(c).
95. Newman, Tax Administration in Striped Trousers: The International Operations
Program of the Internal Revenue Service, 12 TAx L. Rv. 171, 208 (1957).
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accordingly enacted a provision of the Internal Revenue Code requiring
aliens to obtain certificates of compliance (Sailing Permits) from their
local district director prior to each departure. 6 Exceptions are made,
however, for employees of foreign governments or international organiza-
tions, certain alien students and industrial trainees, and other aliens only
temporarily present in the United States."
Generally, the departing alien will have to satisfy the examining
agent that taxes for all prior years have been paid, and will have to pay
any taxes that are due for the period up to his departure, notwithstanding
the fact that his taxable year would not have been terminated but for his
departure, or that his taxes for the preceding taxable year would other-
wise not yet be due. 8
The internal revenue agent may, however, waive the requirement of
payment of taxes if he is satisfied that the taxpayer's departure will not
jeopardize the payment of taxes due at a later date.9 When- however, the
agent is not willing to waive the immediate payment of taxes, the tax-
payer must either pay them, or post a bond for the full amount of taxes
due.100
We have spoken of the duties imposed on departing aliens by the
sailing permit provisions. Now we turn to how effectively these provisions
are being enforced. The regulations state that:
An alien who presents himself at the point of departure without
a certificate of compliance, or evidence establishing that such a
certificate is not required, will be subject at such departure point
to examination by an internal revenue officer or employee and to
the completion of returns and statements and payment of
taxes . .. ."'
A literal reading of this provision would seem to envision the presence
of internal revenue agents at all airports, steamship terminals, railway
stations, and border crossing stations, at points of departure from the
United States. If this were the case, this provision would indeed be an
effective enforcement tool, and would prevent a great deal of tax revenue
from permanently being diverted from our treasury.
Unfortunately, this is not the case in practice. While merely being
"subject to" examination at the point of departure might induce the
departing alien to obtain his sailing permit, there presently is little done
by the Internal Revenue Service to enforce this provision on a regular
96. Section 6851(d).
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.6851-2(a)(2)(ii) (1961).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.6851-2(b) (1961).
99. Section 6851(d) (2).
100. Section 6851(e).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.6851-2(a)(1) (1961).
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basis. In specific instances, of course, if the Internal Revenue Service
has reason to suspect that an alien is about to depart without obtaining
the required clearance, an agent may be sent from the district director's
office to inform the alien that he may not leave without obtaining this
clearance.
The Internal Revenue Service has chosen to rely for enforcement of
the sailing permit provisions on ticket clerks employed by the transpor-
tation companies at the various airline and steamship terminals. In other
words, when an alien presents his ticket and passport at the time of
departure, the clerk is supposed to ask him for his sailing permit, and
refuse him passage when he fails to exhibit it.
If this procedure were followed in all instances, it would indeed
result in a savings of manpower for the Internal Revenue Service, without
a corresponding decrease in enforcement efficiency. Reliance on ticket
clerks has proven to be completely unrealistic, however, since in practice
enforcement is at best sporadic.
While the failure of the transportation companies to enforce the
sailing permit provisions enthusiastically is not to be looked upon with
favor, several factors may explain their attitude:
1. No statute or regulation obligates the transportation companies
to enforce the sailing permit provisions.
2. No sanctions, monetary or otherwise, are available to compel
the companies to enforce the provisions.
3. The companies might well feel that enforcement of the revenue
laws is the function of the Internal Revenue Service, and not of
the carrier.
4. Competitive considerations discourage the carriers from running
the risk of antagonizing passengers.
5. Loss of revenue might result from denying passage to a non-
complying alien.
6. Fear of being subject to legal action when their conduct (resulting
in a passenger missing his flight, for instance) is not required
by law.
One other factor contributing to poor enforcement in this area, is
the lack of centralized responsibility for enforcing the sailing permit
provisions. Each district director is charged with enforcement of the
provisions, and there is a resulting lack of coordination on a national
level.
Reform in this area is seriously needed, both legislatively and ad-
ministratively. If effectively wielded, the sailing permit provisions could
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be a formidable weapon in the arsenal against the international tax
evader.10
2
2. INFORMATION RETURNS
With the advent of the International Operations Division in 1955,
the Internal Revenue Service was able to obtain a clearer understanding
of the overseas activities of our taxpayers. However, in its efforts to make
an accurate analysis, the Service was hampered by the lack of reliable
information as to the precise machinations employed by taxpayers to
minimize taxes. In any event, even on the basis of the limited information
available to it, it was apparent that abuses were widespread, and that
reform was needed, both in strengthening substantive tax provisions, and
in increasing the flow of information reaching the Service.
a. Section 603818
Prior to 1960, the Internal Revenue Service received no systematic
reports concerning the activities of foreign corporations controlled by
United States taxpayers. As a result, many questionable transactions
were escaping Service scrutiny. Senator Gore, in 1960, was quoted as
saying:
The Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service never know
under which shell, if any, certain transactions may be found.104
In order to enable the Service to police this area more closely,
Congress added Section 6038 to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.15
As originally enacted, the section required domestic corporations to give
detailed information as to both corporate structure and activities of
foreign corporations in which they owned more than fifty percent of the
voting stock. The penalty for failing to comply with the reporting re-
quirement was a reduction of the "indirect" foreign tax credit.0 6
In 1962, these reporting requirements were tightened to extend the
definition of "control" to ownership of more than fifty percent in value,
as well as voting power, of stock;' 07 to extend the application of the
requirements to any "United States person," 08 with attribution rules; 09
102. See Part IV, text, infra, p. 74, for suggestions as to possible improvement
in our sailing permit procedures. One aspect of the sailing permit requirements that has
not been mentioned is the desire of the government to simplify travel for tourists from
foreign countries. However, this desire must be weighed against the need to protect our
revenue, and an effective education program should avoid any ill will that might result
from stricter enforcement.
103. See generally, Cohen, Reporting Requirements with Respect to Foreign Subsi-
diaries and Affiliates, 21 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 793 (1963).
104. Id. at 793; CONG. REC. May 31, 1960.
105. Int. Rev. News Release IR-485, April 25, 1962; see Treumann, Recent IRS
Audits of Foreign Operations, 40 TAXES 788, 789 (1962).
106. Section 902.
107. Section 6038(d)(1).
108. Section 6038(a)(1).
109. Section 6038(d) (1).
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and to extend the penalty to loss n° of the direct foreign tax credit."' The
return required by this section must be filed annually."'
b. Section 60461"
In contrast to the annual returns due under Section 6038, which are
a comparatively recent innovation," 4 information returns were required
even under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 upon the formation of a
foreign corporation." 5 However, compliance with the notification require-
ments was at a low level. This may be attributed to the fact that prior to
1960, the requirement for filing the information was imposed on attorneys
and other financial advisors who assisted in the organization of the foreign
corporation, and compliance was successfully resisted through the claim
of the attorney-client privilege.
In 1960, the section was amended to shift the responsibility for
compliance to United States officers, directors, and owners of more than
five percent of the stock of a foreign corporation, who had such status
within sixty days of the formation. However, this provision also proved
ineffective, because it was easily avoided by delaying transfer of owner-
ship and control to United States persons until the expiration of the
sixty day period.
Finally, in 1962, Congress tightened the requirements" 6 to include
reporting by persons who acquire the status more than sixty days after
the formation of the corporation. Unless good cause is shown for failure
to comply with this section, a one thousand dollar civil penalty is im-
posed."'
Although the Internal Revenue Service was assured of more faithful
compliance with Section 6046 in regard to foreign corporations formed
after the passage of the Revenue Act of 1962, it was believed that there
were more foreign corporations controlled by United States taxpayers
than was indicated by the some 4800 returns filed up to 1962. Congress
therefore also agreed in 1962, to extend the stiffened requirements to all
controlled foreign corporations in existence on January 1, 1963.118 This
provision resulted in the filing of more than 24,000 information reports,
110. Section 6038(b) (1) (A).
Ill. Section 901.
112. Section 6038(a)(2).
113. See generally Cohen, supra note 103, at 795 et seq.
114. Since 1960.
115. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 3604(a).
116. The Revenue Act of 1962 has been criticized as being against the international
interests of the United States, but one can question whether policy considerations should
favor increased international trade motivated by tax avoidance motives. See Cohen, Common
Market Operations of Controlled Foreign Corporations Under the Revenue Act of 1962, 15
TAx ExEC. 253 (1963).
117. Section 6679(a).
118. Section 6046(a).
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thus giving the Internal Revenue Service a clearer picture of "shells"
under which taxable transactions might be found." 9
c. Section 6048
United States taxpayers have made use of foreign trusts for purposes
of substantive tax avoidance. Although the tax advantages of using these
trusts were reduced through the Revenue Act of 1962,120 the Internal
Revenue Service received little information about the activities of these
trusts, rendering the area difficult to police.
Congress therefore, in the Revenue Act of 1962, also imposed
reporting requirements on the grantor (if an inter vivos trust), the
fiduciary (if a testamentary trust), or any transferor, in respect to a
trust. 12 1 A report is required upon the creation of, or any transfer of
money or property to a foreign trust. The civil penalty for failure to com-
ply with this provision is five percent of the amount transferred, or
1,000 dollars, whichever is less. 2
The broadening of the disclosure requirements by the Revenue Act
of 1962 may be a significant contribution to the prevention of interna-
tional tax evasion in that United States taxpayers are less likely to engage
in questionable activities when they are aware that the Internal Revenue
Service is scrutinizing their foreign transactions. 8
3. WITHHOLDING AT THE SOURCE
Payors of fixed or determinable income are generally required to
withhold a portion of any payments made to nonresident aliens 124 or
foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business in the United
119. The Treasury Department has not yet (November 22, 1965) completed tabulation
of the results of the strengthened reporting requirements. However, preliminary figures
indicate the following:
1. In over fifty percent of the cases in which a United States investor owns five per-
cent or more of a foreign corporation, his ownership exceeds ninety-five percent of the
stock of that corporation, and approximately seventy-five percent of the time it is fifty
percent or more. These figures are reasonably constant for all geographical areas.
2. United States investments abroad in which the investor owns over five percent
of the stock are concentrated in Canada and Europe (about sixty five percent). The bulk
of the remaining investment is in Central and Latin America. This is true of both debt and
equity investments in these corporations, and applies to undistributed profits as well as to
original investment.
These figures represent data collected as of January 1, 1963.
120. See, e.g., § 643(a) (6).
121. Section 6048(a). The return is due within ninety days after liability for filing
accrues; Treas. Reg. § 16.3-1(e)(1) (1963). Temporary regulations incorporated into
Treas. Reg. § 301.6048-1 (1963).
122. Section 6677(a) ; In addition, willful failure to file the return may result in
criminal penalties under § 7203.
123. Kanter, Congress Expands Information Reporting Requirements for Foreign
Corporate Operations, 42 TAXES 84, 113 (1964).
124. Section 1441(a). Such "fixed or determinable income" includes interest, dividends,
rents, salaries, annuities, and other payments specified in § 1441(b).
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States." 5 The withholding payor then remits the tax withheld to the
Internal Revenue Service,' 26 together with a return showing the amount
of income paid, the name and address of the recipient, and the amount of
tax withheld.'27 This process accomplishes both an intelligence function
(informing the government of the existence of taxable income, and
identifying the taxpayer), and a collection function.
Withholding of tax at the source of income is perhaps the single most
efficient enforcement tool in international tax administration. This is true
for several reasons. The first and most obvious one is that the taxes
practically collect themselves. By imposing liability and responsibility for
collection on persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, a high
degree of compliance is attained, and the legal and administrative prob-
lems engendered by extraterritorial enforcement are avoided. Similarly,
by shifting the responsibility for payment to a country's domestic sub-
jects, in personam jurisdiction is maintained over them, and all collection
and attachment proceedings available in domestic cases may be employed.
The other major reason for the high degree of effectiveness is the rela-
tively low cost of enforcement. Withholding at the source can be policed
by domestic Internal Revenue Service agents in the course of routine
tax audits.
The withholding rate is usually thirty percent,' 28 and ordinarily
equals the total tax due on such periodic income. An exception exists in
the area of personal service income, where the rates are identical for
citizens, resident and nonresident aliens, alike, except that for nonresident
aliens, the minimum tax is thirty percent. 129 However, when the tax
liability on this income exceeds thirty percent, a collection problem is
presented for the excess. Since relatively few nonresident aliens earn more
than would be taxed at thirty percent, it has been questioned whether the
cost of enforcing the progressive rates is warranted.' Legislation recently
introduced in Congress on behalf of the Treasury Department' 8 ' would
eliminate the progressive rates on income earned by nonresident aliens.
The Treasury Department has indicated that we now place great
reliance on our withholding system to collect taxes on foreigners, and may
place even greater reliance on the system in the future. But closer scrutiny
of the withholding system is contemplated to ensure that it is performing
as it should.3 2
125. Section 1442.
126. Section 1461.
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.1461-2(c) (2) (1956).
128. Section 871(a). Many of the tax treaties have provided for a lower rate.
129. Section 871(b); Under 1965 rates, the point at which the effective graduated
rates would exceed thirty percent is 21,200 dollars.
130. Remarks by Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, before the
Tax Executives Institute, Montreal, Canada, September 21, 1964, p. 37.
131. H.R. REP. No. 11297, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
132. Surrey, supra note 130, at 39. Some other statutory enforcement aids are § 6531
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D. Tax Treaties
In Part I, an attempt was made to indicate some of the problems
facing the international tax administrator. The difficulties experienced
in the exercise of the intelligence and collection functions have led the
tax administrator to seek methods of operating more efficiently overseas,
for no matter how effectively enforcement tools are applied within the
domestic jurisdiction, a tax authority's inability to achieve effective en-
forcement overseas is conducive to widespread evasion.
Attempts to enforce tax claims in foreign countries by judicial means
have proved generally futile,'1 8 while efforts to achieve compliance through
informal agreements with foreign tax officials have proved relatively
successful, but depend for their efficacy on personal relationships. The
quest for greater strength and stability in our international tax relation-
ships led to the enactment of bilateral tax treaties with foreign govern-
ments.
While the primary reason for the enactment of tax treaties has been
to eliminate double taxation of the foreign income of domestic taxpayers,
all treaties have some provision for the prevention of evasion.' 34 These
provisions were enacted to ensure that the income should be taxed at
least once.' 3 5
Our first treaties were entered into shortly before World War II.
These early treaties had relatively strong provisions for reciprocal ex-
change of information and enforcement of claims. Most of the treaties
executed after the war, however, have severely restricted the scope of
these provisions. In several instances, treaties were actually signed
containing strong provisions, only to have the Senate condition its ap-
proval on their restriction. 6
1. INFORMATION PROVISIONS
There are three basic types of provisions contained in tax treaties
that apply to the exchange of information. The first allows this exchange
(extending statute of limitations in criminal prosecutions to six years for evasion, etc.);
§ 7001 (requiring license and extending information return requirements to banks or
agents collecting foreign payments of interest or dividends by means of coupons, checks, or
bill of exchange); § 7231 (providing criminal penalties for failure to obtain a license for
the collection of foreign items); § 7456(b) (providing for the production of records in
Tax Court proceedings by foreign corporations, foreign trusts or estates, or nonresident
aliens); and 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1964) (providing procedural rules for enforcement of liens
where the defendants are absent).
133. See Part HI, text, infra at p. 66 et seq.
134. See generally, Note, International Enforcement of Tax Claims, 50 COLUM. L. REV.
490 (1950); Ci. OECD Draft Model Income Tax Convention, text, infra p. 78.
135. "That international incomes be prevented from escaping taxation altogether is
as desirable as that the same income shall not be taxed by several different countries."
Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Double Taxation
and Tax Evasion, 23, (League of Nations 1927); See Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and Inter-
national Income, 17 TAx L. RV. 431, 445 (1962).
136. See note 68 supra.
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only to insure that the beneficial substantive provisions of the treaties
are not availed of by those not entitled to them. This is a rather restrictive
provision, and has limited application.3 7 The second type of provision
provides for this exchange only in specific cases, where one country
requests the information from the other. This is the most common type
of provision. The third type of provision provides for the automatic and
systematic exchange of information as to all payments of fixed or deter-
minable income paid to persons in the other country.' 88
Generally, exchange is not required under the treaties when submis-
sion of the information would disclose a trade secret, or would result in
a violation of the country's public policy. Several of the treaties also
provide that the information requested must be available under the laws
of the country to which the request is directed.
With most countries, the United States gives more information than
it receives."' Although this may impose a slightly greater administrative
burden on our Internal Revenue Service than on the foreign government,
it would be short sighted to set any quota on the exchange of information.
In addition to increasing the flow of information, treaties have also
helped to reduce much red tape. This is true since under the treaties,
exchange of information is conducted directly between the tax administra-
tors of both countries, rather than necessitating processing through
diplomatic channels. 4 °
2. COLLECTION PROVISIONS
In those of our tax treaties that contain collection provisions, these
provisions take one of two forms. The more restricted type is limited to
the collection of taxes resulting from wrongful use of the lower rates
obtained under the treaties. For instance, while the regular rate of
taxation by the United States on dividends received by nonresident aliens
is thirty percent, the treaty with Luxembourg reduces this rate to fifteeen
percent. 4 ' If a nonresident alien wrongfully claims to be a Luxembourg
subject, and takes advantage of the treaty with Luxembourg to pay a
rate of fifteen percent, the Luxembourg authorities will collect the extra
fifteen percent and remit it to our government. 42
137. This type of provision was only contained in the treaty with India (Art. XIV),
which was withdrawn by the President on June 8, 1964.
138. E.g., Treaty with Canada, Art. XX; see McENTYRE, PROCEDURE UNDER T1E
CANADA-UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTION (1947); Treaty with France, Art. 9; Treaty with
the Netherlands, Art. XXI; Treaty with Norway, Art. XVI; Treaty with Sweden, Art. XVI;
op. cit. supra note 45.
139. Caplin, International Cooperation in the Field of Taxation, 14 TAX EXEC. 324,
326 (1962).
140. E.g., Treaty with Switzerland, Art. XIX(2), op. cit. supra note 45: "The
competent authorities of the two Contracting States may communicate with each other
directly for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Convention."
141. Treaty with Luxembourg, Art. IX(1)(a), op. cit. supra note 45. The rate is five
percent for certain corporations. (Art. IX(l) (b)).
142. Id. Art. XVIII(2).
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The second type of provision, which is found primarily in our earlier
treaties, provides for collection of any tax assessment that has been
"finally determined."' 48 From the standpoint of effective enforcement,
this is by far the preferable type of provision. However, not many treaties
have these collection provisions, and even some of the ones that do,
further restrict their applicability to noncitizens of the country whose
aid in collection is sought.
44
Even when collection provisions exist, they have not been availed of
to any extent by our government, for several reasons. First, in enacting
our postwar treaties, Congress affirmatively rejected the insertion of any
liberal collection provisions. Second, in view of the Congressional attitude
thus expressed, the Internal Revenue Service has understandably been
reluctant to take the initiative in exploiting these older provisions.
In several instances, however, the Internal Revenue Service, pursuant
to a request from a country having a treaty with us containing a provi-
sion for collection, has sent a letter to the foreign taxpayer in this country,
indicating the presence of the provision under the treaty, and demanding,
on behalf of the foreign government, payment of the taxes requested. In
almost all instances, the taxpayers in question complied with this request,
and only once did our government almost file suit. However, even in that
case, the taxpayer paid the sum requested before the suit was filed.144a
3. LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON TREATIES
We have briefly indicated that only the early treaties contained
really effective enforcement provisions. Since the United States has so
much to gain from an effective worldwide enforcement system, it seems
surprising that any serious reasons exist for Congressional opposition to
these measures.
We can gain a good insight into Congressional attitudes by studying
the circumstances surrounding the enactment of a Supplementary Protocol
in 1948 to the second treaty with France.
a. The Arguments
At the Senate Finance Committee hearings, spokesmen for several
organizations, including the Foreign Trade Council, the International
143. E.g., Treaty with Sweden, Art. XVII, op. cit. supra note 45.
144. E.g., Treaty with France, Art. 12(5) (added by Art. I(1) of Supplementary
Protocol of 1948, effective January 1, 1950).
144a. The author has been informed by the Internal Revenue Service that a demand
was made by the United States in 1945 upon Signe Hasso, a Swedish citizen for payment
of her Swedish tax liability. On December 28, 1945, a complaint had been dictated by
telephone by the Department of Justice to the United States Attorney in Los Angeles,
California, and had directed that it be filed and served immediately. It was then learned
that Miss Hasso had paid her tax to the Swedish Vice Consul that morning, and the
complaint was not filed.
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Chamber of Commerce, and the United States Chamber of Commerce
vigorously opposed the ratification of strong enforcement provisions.
Among the arguments advanced were:
1. Other countries have discriminatory tax rates on foreign invest-
ment.'45
2. Some of the other tax treaties have no broad enforcement pro-
visions, so why should this one?' 46
3. Where measures of conservancy are authorized, property might
be taken without due process.4
4. Other countries have different concepts of due process. 48
5. Americans working abroad for American interests should not be
denounced to a foreign power by our government. 49
6. The people of the United States never intended that the proceeds
of their taxes should be used to enforce foreign tax claims. Con-
gress never intended that the Internal Revenue Service should
have its officers spending their time, or the time of our courts,
or our revenues, in enforcing the revenue claims of foreign
governments.'5"
7. The likelihood of United States citizens evading their taxes is
remote. " ' We should not subject everyone to the jeopardy of the
application of the enforcement provisions just because there
might someday be a tax evader.'52
8. To use the governmental machinery of one country to enforce
the public policy of another is fundamentally objectionable.' 55
9. The use of "oppressive procedures" might hamper the free move-
ment of capital and deflect it into countries with simple tax
systems which do not require outside assistance for their effective
administration.5
10. Existing treaty provisions for mutual assistance with Sweden
and France have never been implemented by regulations, and it
has evidently not been considered necessary to have any provi-
sions in the treaties with Canada and Great Britain. Therefore,
there is obviously no need for it in our current treaties. 55
145. I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX TREATIES 974 (1961).
146. Id. at 977.
147. Id. at 977.
148. Id. at 1010.
149. Id. at 1047.
150. Id. at 1073.
151. Id. at 1073, 1075, 1103.
152. Id. at 979.
153. Id. at 1105.
154. Id. at 1063.
155. Id. at 1072.
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11. Other treaties draw the line at applying the enforcement pro-
visions to United States citizens, so why should not this one? 5 '
In defense of the provisions for reciprocal enforcement of tax claims,
spokesmen for the United States Treasury Department argued that:
1. The United States should not shield its citizens against the legit-
imate tax claims of the other contracting party.
15 7
2. The reason that lines of nationality were drawn in previous col-
lection provisions was primarily because of discriminatory Nazi
taxes.158
3. Provisions of the treaties relating to the prevention of double
taxation eradicate most problems concerning possible discrimi-
nation in regard to foreign investment."'
4. Collection provisions were not inserted in the treaty with Canada
because Canadian tax authorities have no power to levy and en-
force; they have to go into a Province court for this action. En-
gland was not "quite ready" for the insertion of collection pro-
visions in their treaty.160
b. The Result
The Senate Finance Committee agreed with the opponents of the
collection provisions, and on its recommendation, the Senate refused to
approve the treaty unless the collection provisions were removed. In the
face of this Congressional attitude, these broad provisions have not been
inserted in any of our more recent treaties.
c. A Time for Reappraisal
The Senate rejected the insertion of effective enforcement provisions
in treaties principally because it felt that international evasion was not
a serious problem, or at least not serious enough to warrant the subjection
of American citizens to the enforcement of foreign revenue laws in this
country.
At the time of the hearings on the French treaty, the Treasury
Department was unable to refute the contention that international evasion
was not a serious problem, primarily because it had no reliable statistics
to present. No coordinated effort to check on overseas taxpayer activity
had yet been launched. However, even if it can be assumed arguendo
that in fact little evasion did take place in the late 1940's, the picture has
changed in the course of the last two decades.
156. Id. at 1072.
157. Id. at 1095.
158. Id. at 1087.
159. Id. at 1024.
160. Id. at 978.
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The subsequent increase in taxpayer activity overseas heightened
the evasion problem, and the subsequent investigative activities of the
Office of International Operations highlighted the low level of compliance.
As of February, 1965, the Delinquent Accounts Branch of the 010 had
on its books unpaid assessments totaling over 108 million dollars, which
under present handicaps, pose serious collection problems. The major
argument of the opponents of strong collection provisions has therefore
withered.
The other arguments of the opponents of strict collection provisions
in our tax treaties can be refuted:
1. When collection of another country's taxes would violate our
public policy because these taxes are discriminatory, our govern-
ment would justifiably refuse to comply with a request for collec-
tion. In fact, a common treaty provision allows a country to
refuse to assist the other in the collection of these taxes, or the
exchange of information.'' With this safeguard, it seems im-
plausible for a government to refuse to assist in the collection of
taxes which are not discriminatory (and most taxes fall into this
class).
2. A related argument is that a finding by our Treasury Department
that another country's taxes are discriminatory might lead to
diplomatic embarrassment. In answer, one can well ask whether
it is not even more embarrassing to refuse to collect nondis-
criminatory taxes from a miscreant who is evading his just
obligations .
6 2
3. A strong argument can be made for refusal to collect taxes when
the taxpayer is denied due process. This would occur, for instance,
when a tax is assessed by administrative fiat, with no rights of
appeal. In fact, however, almost all countries have some provisi-
sion for appeal of assessments; and even if no right of appeal
exists, this is one of the risks assumed in transacting business in
such a country. When the United States taxpayer in a country is
treated no worse than any other taxpayer in that country, one
can question whether there should be cause for complaint. Of
course, when the violation to due process is serious enough, or is
discriminatory, the escape valve of "public policy" may always
be resorted to.
4. It is also argued that these provisions subject honest taxpayers
161. E.g., the Treaty with Belgium, Art. XVIII(2), op. cit. supra note 45, provides
that: "The State to which application is made for information or assistance shall comply
as soon as possible with the request addressed to it. Nevertheless, such State may refuse
to comply with the request for reasons of public policy, or if compliance would involve vio-
lation of a business, industrial or trade secret."
162. See also text, infra p. 72 et seq.
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to enforcement provisions aimed at the evader.'63 This argument
can be answered by the statement that as long as the taxpayer
remains honest, he has nothing to fear from the enforcement
powers, and their existence may well serve to keep him honest.
5. The use of our collection facilities and personnel to collect money
for another country has also been criticized. 6 4 This argument
approaches the problem from a strictly economic view, and is
easily refuted by the fact that the amount of delinquent taxes
that would be collected for our government by foreign tax ad-
ministrations would more than offset the additional cost. This
argument might have greater merit if raised by a country whose
international enforcement problem is minimal, and whose leaders
might object to the high cost of collecting our taxes for us, with-
out any concurrent benefits to them.
One might then suggest the payment of a "collection allow-
ance" to any country that collects our delinquent taxes for us.
This would motivate the country to sign a treaty containing col-
lection provisions, as well as stimulate it to undertake an active
enforcement role on our behalf. And, of course, in the present
situation, a resultant windfall might accrue to the Treasury.,65
There are also indications that Congress would be receptive to the
insertion of effective enforcement provisions in our new treaties. Begin-
ning with the Revenue Act of 1960, and most certainly with the Revenue
Act of 1962, Congress showed its determination to take strong measures
to eliminate abuses in the international area. This was partly brought
about by the ability of the Office of International Operations to show the
nature and extent of these abuses. There seems to be no reason why this
enlightened attitude of Congress should not be capitalized upon to achieve
a most significant strengthening of our enforcement capability. 16
4. ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRICTION OF TREATY ENFORCEMENT
One of the arguments raised by the opponents of strong treaty en-
forcement provisions was that the earlier treaties contained broad provi-
sions, but that these were obviously not considered important by the
Treasury Department and were not used.
The principal reason these provisions were not used is that no regula-
tions were ever issued by the Treasury Department to implement them.
At first blush, this appears inexcusable. However, the myriad of conflict-
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid.
165. See "incentives" infra, at note 85.
166. The Treasury Department has indicated that it is presently not attempting to
incorporate collection provisions in its current treaties.
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of-laws problems posed by these provisions are formidable, and there may
have been a certain administrative reluctance to chart a new course.
Then too, the Congressional displeasure that was manifested in the
Senate hearings in the late 1940's may make it understandable why these
provisions in the older treaties were not pursued with much vitality.
Some of the problems that are raised by the enforcement of another
country's revenue laws pursuant to a treaty are:10 7
1. If, for instance, a treaty provides for the collection of revenue
claims "finally determined,"'0 8 what standard would be used for
definition of this term? Would the foreign revenue claim have
to be reduced to judgment, or would mere assessment be suffi-
cient? Would the determination have to be made by a court, or
merely by administrative officials?
2. Could the taxpayer contest the basis for the assessment in our
courts, or would the determination by the foreign country be
given comity, leaving the taxpayer to seek his remedy in the
foreign country?
3. When a collection provision provides that the foreign revenue
claim will be collected in the same manner in which we collect
our own taxes, would our powers pf levy and distraint under the
Internal Revenue Code be applicable? When additional powers
of enforcement and collection are given to the Internal Revenue
Service by legislation enacted subsequent to the signing of a
treaty, would these subsequent powers also be available for the
collection of taxes pursuant to this treaty? Would Congress have
intended the full use of the powers contained in the Internal
Revenue Code for collection of another country's taxes?
4. Would the jeopardy assessment provisions apply to cases in-
volving another country's taxes? Does a lien arise? If so, when?
Does it arise at the time the request is made by the foreign coun-
try for collection assistance? In whose favor does the lien arise-
the foreign country, or the United States on behalf of the foreign
country? Would the foreign tax lien have priority over a United
States tax lien? Would priority be established by time of filing?
Would the claim for foreign taxes be dischargable by the bank-
ruptcy of the taxpayer?
5. When suit is brought, should it be in the name of the United
States, or of the foreign government? Who is to bear the costs
of the suit?
167. See Note, Procedures for Enforcement of Claims under the Treaties, 50 COLUM.
L. REv. 490, 500 et seq. (1950).
168. E.g., Treaty with Sweden, Art. XVII.
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6. Which country's Statute of Limitations applies? What triggers
it? What tolls it?
The above list is by no means exhaustive, but it should give some
indication of the difficult problems that must be coped with before the
enforcement provisions, especially those dealing with the collection of
taxes, are effectively put in motion. One can sympathize with a revenue
official who might be reluctant to embark on a collection program for
another country's taxes with no guidelines to resolve the many difficult
problems posed.
It is questionable whether some of these problems can be resolved
unilaterally, without the agreement of the other party to the treaty. Per-
haps the answer would lie in a supplementary agreement with other coun-
tries which would spell out the answers to these problems. On the other
hand, perhaps the Treasury Department should promulgate proposed reg-
ulations advancing its solutions, and seek suggestions and comments from
all interested parties.
One other alternative is to put detailed provisions in the tax treaties
themselves. This might lead to unwieldy documents, but unless these
provisions are spelled out, much confusion and disagreement may result.
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Stanley S. Surrey, in discussing
the need for a comprehensive examination of treaty drafting practices,
said recently:
(T)his is likely of course to lead to greater technical complexity,
and those with a nostalgia for a simpler era of international tax
relationships will shake their heads. But as national tax systems
grow more complex, and as the expertise of those engaged in
domestic tax matters spreads to those, in Government and out,
dealing with international tax matters, one cannot expect to re-
tain simple international bridges between intricate national
systems. 6'
Although Mr. Surrey was not speaking specifically about the enforcement
provisions in treaties, his words are especially applicable to this complex
area.
Because of the factors indicated, our treaties have not lived up to
the expectations of those who expected full-scale reciprocal tax enforce-
ment. However, they still offer the one great hope for the eventual control
and prevention of international tax evasion.17°
169. Surrey, supra note 130, at 12.
170. In addition to the treaties presently in force, new protocols with Belgium and
Germany have been ratified; treaties with the Philippines, Israel and Thailand are awaiting
ratification; tentative agreements have been reached with the Netherlands and India, and
new treaties are being negotiated with the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Honduras,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Taiwan. Surrey, Remarks at the Tax Institute of America
Symposium, New York, N.Y., December 2, 1965.
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E. Extent of Territorial Enforcement Power-
United States v. First National City Bank'.'
A recent Supreme Court decision both highlights the ease with which
international evasion can be accomplished, and indicates one of the few
judicial remedies available once the evader's property has left the country.
Omar, S.A., a Uruguayan corporation, was engaged in stock market
activities in the United States from 1955 to 1961. It filed its only federal
income tax return in 1959, the incompleteness of which led to an examina-
tion by the Internal Revenue Service. This examination resulted in find-
ings that Omar owed large sums of money to the United States for unpaid
taxes. Omar apparently was unhappy with these findings, and proceeded
to liquidate its United States holdings, and to transfer them out of the
country. The transfer was generally accomplished by having the bro-
kerage firms it did business with transfer, by wire or otherwise, funds to
banks with offices in Uruguay.
On October 31, 1962, the Internal Revenue Service discovered that
Omar's assets were leaving the country, and made jeopardy assessments 72
totalling approximately 19,300,000 dollars. The First National City Bank
of New York has a branch in Montevideo, Uruguay where Omar had
monies in deposit at the time the assessments were made. The same day,
the United States obtained an order in a federal district court which
restrained the bank from transferring out of its Montevideo branch any
monies owed to Omar.17 3
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the district court, and held that Omar had no rights
against the bank that could be enforced in the United States; there was,
therefore, no property within the United States over which a court could
exercise its jurisdiction on behalf of the government.174 This result was
reached primarily on the ground that under New York law, each branch
of a bank is a separate entity, and the depositor has no rights against the
main office unless the branch refuses payment.'75 The court further felt
that it would be treading on sensitive ground were it to attempt to extend
its jurisdiction to property located in a foreign country:
The Supreme Court has made manifest its reluctance to read
an extraterritorial force into statutes when to do so would ex-
tend coverage beyond places over which the United States has
171. 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
172. Under § 6851(a)(1).
173. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 210 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
174. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd en banc,
325 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1964).
175. See Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924); Chrzanowska
v. Corn Exchange Bank, 173 App. Div. 285, 159 N.Y.S. 385 (1st. Dept. 1916), aff'd, 225
N.Y. 728, 122 N.E. 877 (1919).
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legislative control ... or would interfere with the rights of other
nations .... 176;
and again:
The nations of the world have only recently begun to deal with
the problem of extraterritorial collection of tax revenues through
the medium of negotiated tax treaties providing for mutual co-
operation. Absent an explicit indication to the contrary, there
should not be attributed to Congress an intent to give the courts
of this nation, in this highly sensitive area of intergovernmental
relations, the power to affect the rights to property wherever
located in the world. The apparent necessity of tax treaties un-
derscores the conclusion that Congress has seen fit to handle
this problem in another manner.
The banks were understandably concerned because, first, they feared
that the Uruguayan courts might not recognize the order of the district
court, and might order the Uruguayan branch of the bank to pay the
funds to Omar. (However, the district court had indicated that it would
modify its order in that event.) The second reason for concern was that
they feared that foreigners would not put their money in United States
branch banks overseas for fear of having the money subject to levy
in the United States. The Second Circuit agreed that allowing the injunc-
tion to stand would lead to "harmful consequences for our banking system
abroad without any concomitant benefits here at home.' '1 78
The United States Supreme Court granted the government's petition
for writ of certiorari,'179 and subsequently reversed the Court of Appeals
by a seven to two margin.
In his opinion written for the majority, Mr. Justice Douglas saw
the issue merely as whether the court had the power to issue an injunc-
tion against a party before it (in this case National City). In answering
this question in the affirmative, the Court said that:
Whether the Montevideo branch is a 'separate entity' is not
germane to the present narrow issue . . . . Respondent has
actual, practical control over its branches; it is organized under
a federal statute, which authorizes it 'to sue and be sued...
as one entity, not branch by branch. °
Answering the charge that it might be treading on sensitive ground
involving our international relationships, the Court said: "[If] litigation
176. 321 F.2d at 23.
177. 321 F.2d at 24.
178. Ibid. The decision of the Second Circuit was favorably reviewed in Note, 64
CoLum. L. REV. 774 (1964); Note, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 1084 (1964); and Note, 9 VILL. L.
REV. 339 (1964), primarily on the basis of the validity of the "separate entity" principle.
179. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 377 U.S. 951 (1964).
180. 379 U.S. 378, 384.
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might in time be embarrassing to United States diplomacy, the District
Court remains open to the Executive Branch .... 181
In a vigorous dissent, Justices Harlan and Goldberg expressed shock
at the majority opinion, stating that under the decision, only a taxpayer
stupid enough to have funds in a branch of a United States bank overseas
would be caught, and that "In order to provide the government with
this toy pistol, the Court flexes its muscles in a manner never before
imagined."18 2
It is interesting to note the manner in which the government hopes
to recover the money in the Montevideo branch (remembering that the
instant action only served to "freeze" the account):xsa
First, in order to obtain in personam jurisdiction over Omar (which
it did not have in the above action), the government would mail a letter
to Omar in Uruguay, pursuant to the New York substituted service
statute.84 Then the United States would obtain a judgment against Omar
(in the United States), and order Omar to transfer its funds in its
Montevideo account to the United States government. Under the logical
assumption that Omar would not comply with the request, the United
States will then have a court officer appointed under Rule 70, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,""5 who will go to Montevideo to make a de-
mand on the bank branch in the name of the United States.
If the branch refuses payment, it will breach its contract to Omar
to "pay on demand." Since the breach would enable Omar to maintain
an action for breach of contract against the main office of the branch in
New York, this right of cause of action would constitute "property" that
the government could garnish to satisfy its judgment.
Terming this maneuver "procedural cake-walking,"' 6 the Dissent
found it "startling" that "a District Court, aware that a foreign country
would not enforce its judgment, would nonetheless dispatch a court officer
181. Ibid.
182. Id. at 401.
183. Id. at 394.
184. Under the N. Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 302(a), the transaction of any business
within the state by a non-domiciliary gives the court in personam jurisdiction over such
person.
Section 313 of the N. Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. provides that service may be made outside
of the state "by any person authorized to make service within the state who is a resident
of the state or by any person authorized to make service by the laws of the state, territory,
possession or country in which service is made or by any duly qualified attorney, solicitory
barrister, or equivalent, in such jurisdiction."
185. "If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds
or other documents or to perform any other specified act and the party fails to comply
within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the dis-
obedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done has
like effect as if done by the party .... " FED. R. Crv. P. 70.
186. 379 U.S. at 395.
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to the foreign jurisdiction to accomplish that end by self-help.' '187 It
further doubted that such a "novel international adventure' 8 8 would be
looked upon with favor by the foreign country.
89
The rationale of the majority in the Supreme Court opinion appears
to be sound. A court does have the power to enjoin acts which a party
before it has the means of performing or controlling. Any supposed
detriment to foreign branch banking cannot be given priority over the
enforcement power of a court to deal effectively with the parties before
it. Although American banks may seek to avoid the effect of the decision
in future cases by operating abroad through foreign subsidiaries instead
of branches, this seems preferable as a matter of principle to imposing an
unnecessary restraint on a court's ability to exercise its equitable powers.
III. JUDICAL BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
A. General Considerations
In a democratic society, principal reliance is placed on the courts
to effectuate enforcement of the laws; all actions of administrators, as
well as all laws passed by legislators, are subject to the ultimate scrutiny
of the courts. It should therefore be apparent that even if able adminis-
trators apply effective laws, all these efforts can be vitiated by judicial
refusal to give effect to the results of the enforcement activities.
In the United States, few federal laws (especially those dealing with
the enforcement of taxes) are held unconstitutional, and the courts gen-
erally lend the full weight of their power to the enforcement of our reve-
nue laws. Although courts of one state of the union have generally refused
to enforce tax claims of another state, this attitude has been changing,
primarily under the impetus of the full faith and credit provision of the
United States constitution.'9"
International enforcement of revenue claims by judicial means has
proved to be virtually impossible, because of the refusal of courts to lend
their aid to the enforcement of revenue laws of other countries. This has
served to create the single greatest obstacle to the prevention of inter-
national tax evasion.
What are the reasons for this judicial attitude? Should this attitude
change, and if so, what are the chances of this change occurring? These
are the questions that will be considered in this part of our discussion.' 9 '
187. Id. at 396.
188. Id. at 397.
189. Id. at 396.
190. Article IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
191. For a more detailed analysis of the problem, see Castel, Foreign Tax Claims and
Judgments in Canadian Courts, 42 CAN. B. REV. 277 (1964).
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1. COMITY
Generally, courts of one nation will give recognition to laws, execu-
tive or judicial acts of another nation, so long as to do so would not
prejudice its rights, or the rights of its citizens. 92
[T]he recognition of foreign laws cannot be claimed as a right,
but only as a favor or courtesy. It is permitted and accepted
by all civilized communities from mutual interest and con-
venience, from a sense of the inconvenience which would other-
wise result, and from moral necessity to do justice in order that
justice may be done in return.'9 8
In the absence of comity, international trade or transactions would be
stifled, since no country would recognize the decision of a foreign court,
or the acts of a foreign government in its own territory. However, comity
is not universally applied. For instance, courts generally refuse to enforce
laws that are penal in character, or which violate the public policy of the
forum.
2. PUBLIC POLICY
A court will generally refuse to extend the privilege of comity where
to do so would violate some strong policy of the forum, whether expressed
by statute or not.'9 4 However, in order for a foreign law to contravene
public policy, it must "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, or some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal."' 9 5
Courts have refused to enforce a foreign country's tax laws on the
grounds they are in their nature penal,'96 although it is difficult to see
where the purpose of a revenue law would be ordinarily to "punish an
offense against the public justice of the state."' 97 On the other hand, the
ground of public policy may well be used to refuse enforcement of a tax
law that is by its nature discriminatory. An example of this type of law
would be the discriminatory income tax laws passed against the Jews
by the Nazis.' But the refusal of courts to enforce foreign revenue laws
192. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); 11 Am. JuR., Conflict of Laws §
6 (1937).
193. Id. at § 5; Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386 (1910); Disconto Gesellschaft v.
Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570 (1908).
194. 16 Am. JuR. 2D, Conflict of Laws § 6 (1964).
195. Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943).
196. Maryland v. Turner, 75 Misc. 9 (N.Y. 1911); Other cases have not held tax laws
to be penal, but have held them to be of a similar nature in that they both operate in
invitum; see Hand (concurring opinion) Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929).
Although the writer disagrees with the view that revenue laws are by their nature penal,
one can sympathize with the view of G. K. Chesterton, who complained that "a citizen
can hardly distinguish between a tax and a fine, except that the fine is generally much
lighter." New York Times Magazine, April 4, 1965.
197. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
198. Examples of the use of the revenue laws of Nazi Germany to discriminate against
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stems more from a reluctance to break tradition with the past than from
a rational, functional analysis of the problem.
B. Lord Mansfield and his Dictum
The traditional unwillingness of one country to allow another country
to use its courts for enforcement of revenue laws can be traced directly
to a doctrine propounded by Lord Mansfield in two English cases decided
in the eighteenth century. In Holman v. Johnson,199 a contract for the
sale of tea was made in Dunkirk, and delivery was made there. The
defendant resisted payment in England on the grounds that the plaintiff
knew that the tea would be smuggled into England, and that since the
contract was founded on an intention to make an illicit use of the tea,
the plaintiff was not entitled to the assistance of an English court to
recover the price. Thereupon the court held that since the contract and
delivery were both legal at the place made, the subsequent smuggling
could have no effect. Lord Mansfield then said "For no country ever takes
notice of the revenue laws of another.""' This was added as "pure
dictum."12 1
Lord Mansfield reiterated his dictum in Planche v. Fletcher.2  This
case involved the shipment of goods from England to France, the ship
being captured by France, which was at war with England. The under-
writer refused payment of insurance on the grounds that the ship was
cleared for Belgium, when there was no intention of going there. The
court held that it was commercial practice to do this, probably because
customs rates were lower in Belgium. Lord Mansfield then added that
motive did not matter, because "one nation does not take notice of the
revenue laws of another."
In a case decided less than half a century later,03 the issue was
whether a receipt that did not bear the French stamp tax could be ad-
mitted in an English court. The court held the receipt admissible, saying
Jews ranged from denial of "children's allowance" for parents with Jewish children (§§ 27,
39(3)3, 32(3) Einkommensteuergesetz (Income Tax Law) (EStG. 1938) (1938) Reichs-
gesetzblatt I, p. 121 (Ger.)) ; denial of deductions for medical, etc., expenses attributable
to children or other relatives who were Jewish (§§ 10(2)1, 21(3), and (33) Durchfiihrungs-
bestimmungen zum Einkommensteuergesetz (Income Tax Regulations) (ESt.DB) Law of
March 17, 1939, (1939) Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 503 (Ger.); application of "social-equaliza-
tion" 15 percent surtax to Jews (Zweite Verordnung zur Durchfiihrung der Verordnung iber
die Erhebung Eines Sozialausgleichs, Law of December 24, 1940, (1940) Reichsgesetzblatt I,
p. 1666 (Ger.)).
199. I Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775).
200. One writer credits the existence of international tax evasion as stemming in large
part from this statement. Note, International Enforcement oj Tax Claims, 50 COLUM. L, Rv.
490 (1950).
201. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193
S.W.2d 919 (1946).
202. 1 Dougl. 251, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (K.B. 1779).
203. James v. Catherwood, 3 Dow & Ry. 190 (K.B. 1823).
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"It has been settled, or at least considered as settled, ever since the time
of Lord Hardwicke, 04 that in a British court, we cannot take notice
of the revenue laws of a foreign state . . . ." Then in Sharp v. Taylor,
205
which involved a false ship registration, the court held that it would not
refuse to enforce rights because some fiscal law of a foreign country
had been violated.
As pointed out in State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Rodgers,06
it was from the foregoing cases that the rule that "no country will take
notice of the revenue laws of another" originated. "In none of them was
an attempt made to collect a tax due a foreign state, but involved the
question whether a contract violating a foreign law was enforceable in
England. '20 7 Be that as it may, courts have consistently refused to enforce
the revenue laws of other countries, 20 although as already noted, the
trend in the United States is to enforce the laws of one state in another
under the full faith and credit provisions of the United States Con-
stitution. °9
Under our Anglo-American legal system, the doctrine of stare decisis
gives great weight to tradition, and in the area of international tax
enforcement this doctrine has been used to solidify a principle of doubtful
validity into a "strong fortress ' 210 which has proved impervious to at-
tempts at breach through judicial means.2
204. The court was probably referring to the case of Boucher v. Lawson, Cases Temp.
Hardwicke 85, 95 (K.B. 1734). There the plaintiff shipped gold from Portugal to England
in violation of Portuguese law. The master of the ship refused to deliver the gold in
England, and defended the suit on the basis that since the act was criminal, the court
should refuse a remedy. This defense was denied on the basis that to allow it would "cut
off all benefit of such trade from this kingdom, which would be of very bad consequence
to the principal and most beneficial branches of our trade."
205. 2 Phill. 801, 41 Eng. Rep. 1153 (K.B. 1848).
206. Note 201 supra.
207. Id. at 1120.
208. Peter Buchanan, Ltd. v. McVey, [1955] A.C. 516 (Erie, 1951); Government of
India, Ministry of Finance v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491 (H.L.); Cf. Moore v. Mitchell, 30
F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (concurring opinion, L. Hand); in his dissenting opinion in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 413-14 (1964), Mr. Justice White, in
indicating areas where the "act of state" doctrine is not applied, said: "The principle that
the courts of one country will not enforce or give effect to the fiscal or penal claims of other
countries is a rule of international law which is a part of the law of the United States."
209. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). However, where the
revenue claim has not been reduced to judgment, the state court may refuse to enforce the
revenue claim of another state. See City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 184
N.E.2d 167 (1962).
210. Opinion of Viscount Simonds in Government of India, Ministry of Finance v.
Taylor, note 205 supra.
211. Some courts have indicated that if change is warranted, it is the task of the
executive or legislative branches of government, Government of India, Ministry of Finance
v. Taylor, supra note 205; "The apparent necessity of tax treaties underscores the conclusion
that Congress has seen fit to handle [the international enforcement of tax claims] in
another manner." United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 24 (1963), rev'd, 379
U.S. 378 (1965).
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C. United States v. Harden
The recent Canadian case of United States v. Harden, 12 underscores
the extent of governmental impotence in the international enforcement
of tax claims, even when the taxpayer has agreed as to the correctness of
the determination of the amount of taxes due, and when the claim was
reduced to judgment. It seems especially anomalous that such a situation
should exist between two countries having a common border, language218
and similar economic interests.
1. THE FACTS
On June 10, 1957, the United States brought suit against Esperanza
P. Harden in a United States District Court, alleging that she was in-
debted to the United States for unpaid taxes of some 865,000 dollars. As
a result of pre-trial hearings before a district judge, it was stipulated that
judgment might be entered against the taxpayer for a total of 639,500.15
dollars. Judgment was then entered pursuant to the stipulation. 14 The
United States then instituted suit on the judgment in the Supreme Court
of British Columbia. The defendant moved to set aside the proceedings
on the ground that the action was an attempt to enforce the revenue
laws of a foreign country, and this motion was granted .2 1  The Court
of Appeal for British Columbia affirmed, 16 as did the Supreme Court
of Canada.217
2. THE OPINION
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the rule that "foreign states
cannot directly or indirectly enforce their tax claims here" was rooted in
public policy, and could not be avoided through merger in a judgment, or
by conversion into a contractual agreement.
While basically grounding its decision on the fact that all the prece-
dents support the proposition of nonenforceability of international tax
claims, it quoted language from both an English and an American case
which suggest reasons for the existence of the doctrine. The English
case, Government of India, Ministry of Finance v. Taylor,2 18 stated that:
One explanation of the rule ... may be thought to be that en-
forcement of a claim for taxes is but an extension of the sov-
ereign power which imposed the taxes, and that an assertion
212. [1963] Can. Sup. Ct. 366.
213. La province de Quebec nonobstant.
214. United States v. Harden, Civil No. 710-57 (S.D. Cal.) Mar. 13, 1961, modified
Mar. 24, 1961. The author has been advised by the Internal Revenue Service that Mrs.
Harden obtained United States citizenship by marriage in 1917, and it is assumed that she
was still a United States citizen during the tax years involved in the litigation being discussed.
215. United States v. Harden, 30 D.L.R.2d 566 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1961).
216. United States v. Harden, 36 D.L.R.2d 602 (B.C. 1962).
217. [1963] Can. Sup. Ct. 366.
218. Note 208 supra.
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of sovereign authority by one State within the territory of an-
other, as distinct from a patrimonial claim by a foreign sover-
eign, is (treaty or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of
independent sovereignties.
The American case cited was Moore v. Mitchell,2 19 where Judge Learned
Hand, in a concurring opinion, reasoned that:
To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another
state is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of the court;
it involves the relations between the States themselves, with
which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are intrusted
to other authorities. It may commit the domestic State to a
position which would seriously embarrass its neighbor. Revenue
laws fall within the same reasoning; they affect a State in mat-
ters as vital to its existence as its criminal laws. No court ought
to undertake an inquiry which it cannot prosecute without deter-
mining whether those laws are consonant with its own notions of
what is proper.
Considering further the Taylor case, the Court cited language to the
effect that States "have not in the past thought it appropriate to seek
to use legal process abroad against debtor taxpayers. They assumed,
rightly, that the courts would object to being so used .... ""'
It is apparent that the law in its present state prohibits international
enforcement of tax claims, in the absence of a treaty. In fact in the
Harden case, the United States did not even contest this fact in its brief.
It chose to rely on the arguments that a court should not look behind a
judgment, and that the instant case involved a contractual agreement
(the pre-trial stipulation). One can readily agree, however, that "although
imbedded in a long legal tradition, the doctrine which prevents one state
from enforcing its revenue laws in the courts of another deserves critical
reappraisal." 2
D. The Case for Comity
Legal doctrines, however rooted in tradition, must periodically be
tested to see whether they can meet the demands of a changing society.
The doctrine denying recognition to foreign tax claims arose when
there was great commercial rivalry and international suspicion. It was
219. Ibid.
220. [1963] Can. Sup. Ct. 366, 372.
221. KATZ & BREWSTER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 748
(1960); see also DICEY, CON-JLIcT OF LAWS (7th Ed. 1958): "Doubtless in individual cases
these [foreign revenue laws] may have to be disregarded (as may any other type of foreign
rule) on the grounds of public policy, but there is no logical justification (whatever may
have been felt in the eighteenth century) for the indiscriminate exclusion of all foreign
revenue law. Several judges have doubted the proposition, and the leading case supporting
it seems to have been based on a misapprehension"; see also Note, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1327
(1964).
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employed to enforce private commercial agreements that foreign revenue
laws would otherwise have rendered invalid. Today conditions have
changed. International trade has increased greatly, with international
cooperation replacing suspicion; with regional economic planning re-
placing domestic protectionism. Isolationism is a product of the past, hav-
ing been replaced by international aid, assistance, and interdependence.
Let us examine the arguments advanced by the advocates of the
status quo. (Note: Some of these arguments have already been considered
in the discussion of tax treaty provisions.)
1. A revenue law is the manifestation of sovereign power, and can
have no extraterritorial effect.2 2 This argument would be valid
in the absence of the concept of comity. Since comity is a privi-
lege extended by a sovereign, no affront to sovereignty can exist
where the right is not absolute. On the contrary, the concept of
international cooperation would seem to encourage one govern-
ment to assist another in the exercise of its just functions.
Directly related to this argument is the one that one govern-
ment should not punish violation of the laws of another govern-
ment, or avenge a wrong done to another government. Whatever
the validity of this argument as applied to crimes, it seems in-
applicable to the failure of a taxpayer to fulfill a financial obliga-
tion to his country. "Tax laws are not passed to punish people. 2
2. Holding a foreign tax law to violate our public policy might em-
barrass our government's international relations. This is the
argument of Judge Hand in Moore v. Mitchell.2  In essence, it
runs as follows:
a) We will not extend comity where to do so would violate
our public policy.
b) This necessitates our courts' pronouncement as to
whether or not a foreign law is of the type we will
enforce.
c) Should we hold a foreign law to violate our public pol-
icy, we would be treading on delicate ground, and might
embarrass our executive department in its conduct of
our foreign affairs.
d) Rather than place our courts in this embarrassing pre-
dicament, our courts should refuse to enforce any foreign -
tax law.
222. United States v. Harden, D.L.R.2d 366, 378 (1963) citing Government of India,
Ministry of Finance v. Taylor, supra note 205 at 511; see 1 OPPENHEAM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 328-330 (8th ed. 1955).
223. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodgers, supra note 201, at 1127.
224. Note 208 supra.
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It is true that determining questions of public policy is a dif-
ficult task for a court. But difficulty does not justify refusal
to face the problem. Indeed, refusing to enforce a valid revenue
law of a friendly country might cause even greater embarrass-
ment to our nation than would result under the doctrine.
In the event that our government might be embarrassed by
holding a foreign law to violate our public policy, the courts
could always permit our State Department to appear in the case
as amicus curiae.
3. It is difficult for a taxpayer to defend a suit for taxes arising in
a foreign country. Any inconvenience resulting from having to
defend a suit in a foreign country arises generally through the
actions of the taxpayer in removing himself or his property from
the taxing jurisdiction; the taxpayer thus should have no cause
for complaint.
The present doctrine of refusing to enforce foreign revenue claims
is conductive to jurisdiction-hopping, and results in loss of revenue with
the attendant shifting of the tax burden to law-abiding citizens. The doc-
trine is no longer valid, and should be changed.
Unfortunately, judicial doctrine changes slowly, and some courts
have indicated that if change is to come, it should emanate from the
executive or legislative branches of the government.2" Therefore, the
most expeditious manner of superseding Lord Mansfield's dictum appears
to be by means of tax treaties containing reciprocal enforcement pro-
visions.
IV. PREVENTION OF EVASION-A SUGGESTION FOR PROGRESS
A. Judicial Reform
1. DISCARD LORD MANSFIELD'S DICTUM
We have indicated that the rule of law that "One nation does not
take notice of the revenue laws of another" is an anachronism that should
have been discarded long ago. Unfortunately, however, it is unlikely
that a change in viewpoint will be accomplished by judicial means. In
fact, even if we were to assume that a change could occur, it would not
happen in the near future. The process of legal evolution is a slow one,
especially in international law, and there is no one forum which could
effect a change that would be binding on all others. Change, as it surely
must come, will have to arrive on another vehicle, preferably that of the
bilateral or multilateral tax treaty.
225. See note 211 supra.
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2. ENACT A FEDERAL LONG-ARM RULE
The case of United States v. First National City Bank, points up
another problem that has not previously been considered herein. In that
case the taxpayer (Omar, S.A.) had not been served, and the court did
not have in personam jurisdiction over it. It was suggested that since the
cause of action arose in New York, the government, to collect the taxes
under injunction, could avail itself of New York's long-arm statute,22 6
which authorizes service of process outside of the jurisdiction for any
cause of action arising therein.
It would be of great assistance to the government if this provision
for extraterritorial effectuation of jurisdiction could be availed of no
matter where in the world the defendant is found. Also, if collection pro-
visions are inserted in our future tax treaties, in personam jurisdiction
over the taxpayer might be a requisite to collection assistance by the
other country. It is therefore suggested that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure be amended to provide for this assumption of jurisdiction. 27
B. Legislative Reform
1. TAX TREATIES
The most obvious direction for future legislative action lies in the
field of ratifying tax treaties containing strong and effective enforcement
provisions. However, this is a subject of sufficient importance to merit
separate treatment.228
2. SAILING PERMITS
The present inadequacies of the sailing permit provisions have al-
ready been mentioned. While the direction for improvement lies primarily
in the administrative sphere, legislative assistance could be rendered by
the following means:
226. N.Y. Civ. PR~c. L. & R. 313; see note 184 supra.
227. Cf. § 6212, authorizing a notice of deficiency to be mailed to the taxpayer by
registered or certified mail to his last address; § 6303 authorizes notice of demand for
payment to be left at the dwelling or usual place of business of the taxpayer or to be sent
by mail to his last known address. Under Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932), a
citizen may be bound by a subpoena served on him in a foreign country, where the litigation
involves "obligations inherent in allegiance." Id. at 438, n.5; see also Uniform Interstate and
International Procedure Act, 11 Am. J. ComP. L. 415 (1962); as far as service in the
United States in connection with a foreign action, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1696 (1964), "The
district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order service upon
him of any document issued in connection with a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal."
To avoid assets of foreign taxpayers (individuals and corporations) from leaving the
country (as in the United States v. First Nat'l City Bank case), it might be suggested that
any such transfer of funds be subject to prior governmental control. However, in the
writer's opinion, any such attempt at control would impose too great a restraint on inter-
national commerce.
228. See p. 76 infra.
[VOL. XX
INTERNATIONAL TAX EVASION
1. The enactment of legislation prohibiting any transportation
company from allowing passage to aliens who have not exhibited
Certificates of Compliance, or proof that a certificate is not
required.
2. The enactment of legislation imposing sanctions, financial or
otherwise, on any transportation company not complying with
the above.
3. ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS
Present legislation requires all aliens to file with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service an annual report of address form." 9 This annual
registration card could also be used as a source of information for the
Internal Revenue Service by requiring the alien to indicate on the card
whether or not he had any earnings from United States sources during
the preceding year, or, in the case of resident aliens, whether they had
earnings from any sources whatsoever during the preceding year.
This requirement would not impose a great burden on either the
alien or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and would provide
the Internal Revenue Service with a valuable source of information.
C. Administrative Reform
1. SAILING PERMITS
Suggestions for legislative action in the Sailing Permit area have al-
ready been considered. Administrative procedures that would strengthen
enforcement in this area could include the following:
1. In order to preclude transportation company employees from
exercising their discretion in allowing aliens to embark without
Sailing Permits, the Internal Revenue Service should provide all
those not subject to the sailing permit requirements with a card
or form to exhibit to the transportation company employees.
These cards could be issued through the State Department to
persons in exempt status.
2. An 010 agent should be stationed at each major terminal at
cities providing points of departure for overseas, for purposes of
enforcing the compliance provisions. Noncomplying passengers
could be referred to this agent by transportation company per-
sonnel for a determination that no certificate is required, or for
such other action as may be warranted. This agent might also
physically restrain an evader from departing, if necessary.
229.
(1957).
8 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (1964) ; for information currently required see 8 C.F.R. § 265.11
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3. Responsibility and control of point of departure enforcement
should be transferred from local district director jurisdiction to
the Office of International Operations, although the routine is-
suance of Certificates of Compliance could still remain a function
of the local district director. This would serve to coordinate all
international enforcement through the Office of International
Operations, while leaving routine taxpayer contact to the local
level.
4. The Internal Revenue Service should, in cooperation with the
Immigration Service and State Department, initiate a taxpayer
education program to inform aliens of the necessity for the
Certificate of Compliance requirements, and of the need for effec-
tive enforcement.
This program should help offset any irritation that might
be caused through the transition from a weak policy to an effec-
tive one. As one aspect of this program, circulars could be dis-
tributed through transportation companies or other sources hav-
ing contact with departing aliens.
2. EXTENSION OF INFORMAL COOPERATION
The effectiveness of an international enforcement program depends
to a great extent on the cooperation existing among tax administrators
in various countries. Today, much is being done to educate foreign tax
officials as to the necessity for a strong tax enforcement program. The
Internal Revenue Service has set up a Foreign Tax Assistance Staff,
which has initiated programs to assist countries in the development of
their tax systems. On an unofficial level, the Harvard Law School trains
foreign tax officials in its International Program in Taxation.
These activities should be encouraged and continued. The personal
camaraderie thus developed among the tax officials of the world can be
a significant element in the removal of barriers of distrust and misunder-
standing that might otherwise exist.
D. Tax Treaties
1. FORWARD, NOT BACKWARD
In 1950, a writer commenting about the status of the use of tax
treaties for international tax enforcement said "[A]Ithough the need for
improvement should be recognized, the achievements of the immediate
past should not be ignored."28 At the time there were but eight treaties
230. Note, International Enforcement of Tax Claims, supra note 200, at 504.
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in force; today there are more than twenty."' Today, fifteen years later,
those "achievements" have all but disappeared.
Not only have all the subsequent treaties failed to include meaning-
ful collection provisions, but even the collection provisions in the
older treaties have been largely ignored. The Treasury Department has
concentrated all its treaty activity in the area of prevention of double
taxation, and the second avowed purpose of the treaties, "Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion," has become the forgotten stepchild of international
taxation. The reasons for this have already been mentioned: Congres-
sional disapproval in the past, administrative indifference, and Treasury
Department preoccupation with substantive treaty problems.
The attempts in the late 1940's to put effective collection provisions
in treaties failed primarily because at the time the Treasury Department
was not in a position to refute the contention that international evasion
was no real problem, and did not warrant interference with our interna-
tional trade. It has become evident that Congressional attitudes have
since changed. With the advent of the predecessor of the 010 in 1955, the
Treasury Department was able to accumulate information and statistics
indicating widespread abuses in the international area. Congress re-
sponded by enacting strong enforcement legislation in 1960, and even
stronger legislation in 1962.
What is now needed is a comprehensive program on the part of the
Treasury Department to educate Congress as to the need for strong
collection provisions in our new treaties. Congress helped solve the prob-
lem of obtaining information by the 1960 and 1962 Revenue Acts. But
we have indicated that information is not enough. The taxes must be
collected.
2. INCENTIVES
Once Congress is convinced that we should have collection provisions
in our treaties, our next task will be to convince the countries with which
we are negotiating tax treaties, that these collection provisions would also
be in their interest.
This may be a problem, especially with the less developed countries.
They may understandably take the attitude that they cannot afford to
allocate any of their meager resources to collecting our taxes for us.
After all, few of their taxpayers have investments in other countries,
231. Although only twenty-two treaties are presently in effect, many former colonies
of countries with whom we have treaties are still covered by such treaties, resulting in the
United States having tax treaty relationships with these additional countries: Burundi,
Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda,
and Sierra Leone; U.N. Doc. No. F/3905/Add. 1, Annex III, p. 24 (May 26, 1964). Trinidad
and Tobago terminated its treaty with the United States effective January 1, 1966. Treasury
Dept. News Release F-330, Jan. 6, 1966.
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and the chances of their calling on us for assistance with collection of
their taxes is remote.
A suggestion that might meet this argument would be to offer to
these countries a collection allowance of, perhaps, fifteen percent of the
delinquent taxes collected for us, to offset any possible costs of collection.
This would provide the needed incentive to induce the foreign country
to make a determined effort to collect our taxes. The overall cost of these
collection allowances would be comparatively small, and the knowledge
that the tax evader will face rigorous enforcement by the tax officials of
any country to which he repairs may well deter evasion.
Of course, the approval of Congress would have to be obtained for
this provision. But Congress could also provide that any collection
allowances so paid should be assessed against the taxpayer involved,
resulting in no net collection cost to our government.
3. PROMULGATION OF REGULATIONS
The administrative and legal problems inherent in enforcement of
collection provisions are not suitable for resolution on a local enforcement
level. Guidelines must originate at the national level for local enforcement
officers to follow. It is therefore imperative that the Treasury Depart-
ment promulgate regulations under the tax treaties that will end the
doubt, confusion, and uncertainty that presently attend and impede the
full and effective implementation of the collection provisions.
Merely having collection provisions in a treaty is not enough. Full
use must be made of them. The Justice and Treasury Departments should
indicate, as a matter of policy, that their respective tax enforcement
units should act to exploit these enforcement tools to their fullest extent.
4. UNIFORMITY OF TREATIES--OECD
In an effort to achieve a degree of uniformity in the drafting of in-
come tax treaties, the Fiscal Committee of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) promulgated a Model Income
Tax Treaty. 82 This draft treaty was meant to be used as a guide by
countries negotiating treaties, and also contained provisions relating to
the exchange of information between governments. The model provision
is as follows:
Article 26
Exchange of Information
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall
exchange such information as is necessary for the carrying
out of this Convention and of the domestic laws of the Con-
232. Report of Fiscal Committee, O.E.C.D. Draft Double Taxation Convention on
Income and Capital C(63) 87 (1963).
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tracting States concerning taxes covered by this Convention
insofar as the taxation thereunder is in accordance with this
Convention. Any information so exchanged shall be treated
as secret and shall not be disclosed to any persons or authori-
ties other than those concerned with the assessment or collec-
tion of the taxes which are the subject of the Convention.
2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed
so as to impose on one of the Contracting States the
obligation:
a) To carry out administrative measures at a variance
with the laws or the administrative practice of that
or the other Contracting State;
b) To supply particulars which are not obtainable
under the laws or in the normal course of the admin-
istration of that or the other Contracting State;
c) To supply information which would disclose any
trade, business, industrial, commercial, or profes-
sional secret or trade process, or information, the
disclosure of which would be contrary to public
policy (order public).23
The official commentary which accompanies the draft article in-
dicates that the purpose of the above provisions is not to prevent evasion,
but merely to obtain sufficient information from which to lay a basis for
taxation under the Convention." 4 The Commentary also states that "Con-
tracting States should be free to agree bilaterally on special provisions
intended to prevent fiscal fraud or evasion of tax."
Because the draft provision has no application to the prevention of
evasion, the United States must insist on such "special provisions" in
its treaties. 2
35
It is regrettable that the Model Convention did not contain provi-
sions against evasion. First, these measures may now be looked upon as
unusual or extraordinary measures, and it may be difficult to persuade
other countries as to their necessity. Second, a uniform provision for
prevention of evasion would simplify the promulgation of regulations,
since all efforts could then be concentrated on drafting one set of regula-
tions that could apply to all treaties.
5. MULTILATERAL TREATIES
The recommendation of the Council of the OECD that members
examine the feasibility of concluding multilateral treaties based on the
233. Id. at 56.
234. Id. at 157.
235. As one indication of the difficulty that may be encountered in convincing other
nations of the need for strong enforcement provisions, Switzerland entered an express
reservation on the Article. Report of Fiscal Committee, supra note 232 at 160.
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OECD model may well foreshadow a new era of international coopera-
tion.2"6 Whatever the merits of such a treaty from the standpoint of
eliminating double taxation, it is very doubtful whether such a treaty
could presently be enacted with the anti-evasion provisions herein
advocated. Perhaps, and hopefully, the passage of time will be ac-
companied by such progress in this area that such a multilateral treaty
could become a reality. However, it appears that our efforts could be
directed more fruitfully toward first achieving success on a bilateral
basis.
The successful enactment of strong collection provisions in treaty
after treaty would then indicate a trend which might be followed in a
multi-national agreement.
CONCLUSION
The main reason for the extensiveness of international tax evasion
is a psychological one. The informed evader knows that even if his
nefarious activities are brought to light by the tax authorities, there is
little chance of the government collecting the tax deficiency thus es-
tablished so long as the evader and his property remain outside of the
physical jurisdiction of the country to which the taxes are owed.
Through a determined effort on the part of the Treasury Depart-
ment to insert effective enforcement provisions in our tax treaties, artificial
national boundaries will no longer serve the evader as a shelter behind
which he can avoid the payment of his just tax obligations.
Moreover, the sinew of an enforcement muscle thus strengthened
may well of itself dissuade many a potential evader from embarking on
his evil course.
By convincing the evader that his efforts will prove to no avail, the
ultimate method of preventing international tax evasion will have been
achieved.
236. See Fox, Functioning of the Office of International Operations, 22 N.Y.U. TAX
INST. 735, 748 (1964) ; Surrey, Remarks Before the Tax Executives Institute, Montreal,
Canada, September 21, 1964, at 26.
